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ABSTRACT 
To defeat the terrorist threat facing the U.S., the 9/11 Commission recommended 
a balanced strategy to attack the terrorists and prevent recruitment, while protecting 
against future attack.  A review of the national strategies related to counterterrorism and 
homeland security, shows they do not provide a balanced approach.  Specifically, they 
fail to counter the factors influencing individuals to conduct terrorism.  Disruption of the 
radicalization process, becomes more significant, when, considering the threat is no 
longer just of foreign origins, it is increasingly from within.  Adding to this dilemma, 
evidence shows terrorist networks are becoming less centralized and placing greater 
emphasis on individual actions. 
Based on the evolving threat, this thesis explores what strategy offers the most 
balanced approach.  To answer this question, an exploratory study was conducted to 
define the threat and causes of radicalization.  The current U.S. strategies were evaluated 
to determine if they adequately addressed the research findings.  Additionally, 
international approaches were analyzed to determine if any lessons learned could be 
incorporated into a U.S. strategy. 
The recommendation is to complement existing strategies with a 
counterradicalization strategy.  The proposed multi-dimensional solution offers several 
options to counter radicalization: traditional and non-traditional educational programs, 
outreach programs, and community involvement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper.  You can make a hundred 
brilliant saves, but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets 
past you. 
Paul Wilkinson, London Daily Telegraph, September 1, 19921 
Since September 11, 2001, there has not been a successful mass casualty attack in 
the U.S. by either transnational, transnational-inspired, or domestic terrorists.  In 
comparison, some of the Nation’s friends and allies in the “war on terror,” have been 
victimized by terrorist attacks, many of which were executed by “homegrown” militant 
Islamists.  While the U.S. has not been immune to similar transnational or homegrown 
plots2 during this time, many were detected early on, and disrupted prior to execution 
(McNeill and Carafano, 2009).  Based on these rudimentary points, one could surmise 
that the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, combined with the homeland security measures 
implemented since 2001, has effectively met the challenge. 
One might even argue the greatest threat to the homeland is now posed by natural 
events.  Hurricanes, wildfires, pandemics, and economic issues seem to capture the 
public’s attention, and, in a way, have shifted the focus of homeland security efforts 
toward more of an “all hazards” approach.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(NSHS) reflects this evolution in thought by stating, “threats come not only from 
terrorism, but also from nature…certain non-terrorist events that reach catastrophic levels 
can have significant implications for homeland security” (Homeland Security Council, 
2007, 3).  Even the most recent Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment starts 
with the line, “The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global 
economic crisis and its geopolitical implications” (Blair, 2009, 2).  Terrorism seems to 
 
 
                                                 
1 Retrieved September 16, 2009, from http://www.notable-quotes.com/t/terrorism_quotes.html. 
2 According to publically available sources, since 9/11, 23 plots by Islamic extremists (homegrown 
and internationally based) targeting the U.S. have been disrupted (McNeill and Carafano, 2009, 1). 
 2
have returned to faraway places like London, Madrid, Baghdad, Kabul, Islamabad, 
Mumbai, and Jakarta.  Therefore, for those not directly involved with countering 
terrorism, it is easy to miss an event like that occurring on October 29, 2008. 
Admittedly, an attack in Somaliland probably would not have registered high on 
the scale of many counterterrorism experts, or the mass media for that matter.  If 
anything, the attack may have been noticeable, because it was one of multiple 
synchronized suicide attacks carried out that day in Somalia by a relatively unknown 
militant Islamist group, al-Shabaab (The Youth) (Meryhew, Shah, and Walsh, 2009).  It 
was long after the dust had settled that the identity of one of the attackers, Shirwa Ahmed 
(a naturalized U.S. citizen from Somalia), became of interest to authorities and the media.  
Unlike his counterparts, Ahmed stood out for one particular reason.  The graduate of 
Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis, Minnesota, is believed to be the first U.S. citizen 
to be a suicide terrorist bomber (Mudd, 2009).  Since this event happened overseas, 
Ahmed’s death has become an afterthought of history, plus a potential warning for the 
future. 
At a time when the 2001 attacks seem so long in the past, and terrorism the 
problem of other countries, the very radicalization process that created the 9/11 attackers 
exists all around us; including such places as Minneapolis.  One then has to ask—is the 
threat really that far away?  Are the Nation’s strategies ready for the next threat? 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) was last updated to 
incorporate an “increased understanding of the enemy” (White House, 2006, 1).  The 
threat was characterized as “a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical 
ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder” (White House, 2006, 1).  Al-Qa’ida was seen 
as the vanguard of this movement3 and, along with its affiliations and those inspired by 
                                                 
3 Sometimes referred to as the Jihadi movement, the Salafi-Jihadist movement, radical Islamist 
movement, or violent Islamic extremism.  For consistency sake, militant Islamist movement (or ideology) 
will be used in this thesis.  Similarly, militant will replace the term Jihadist (unless in a title, citation, or 
direct quote) for reasons explained in Chapter III. 
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them, “the most dangerous present manifestation” (White House, 2006, 5).  Produced the 
following year, the NSHS continued to view al-Qa’ida as “the most serious and dangerous 
manifestation” (Homeland Security Council, 2007, 9). 
The past election year saw a significant amount of debate regarding the nature of 
the risk al-Qa’ida poses to the homeland, some of which played out in such journals as 
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy.  The argument primarily centered around two 
schools of thought.  Bruce Hoffman (2008), a renowned terrorism expert and professor at 
Georgetown University, believed al-Qa’ida was “alive and well and plotting high profile 
attacks much as it did before 9/11” (Hoffman).  The counter to this argument came from 
Marc Sageman (2008a), a forensic psychiatrist, political sociologist, and former CIA case 
officer, who argued the greater threat was posed by a “leaderless jihad” consisting of a 
decentralized network of self-radicalized individuals without operational direction from 
al-Qa’ida.  A third perspective (provided by President-elect Barack Obama speaking on 
the significance of Usama bin Laden), was that if al-Qa’ida’s leadership infrastructure 
was “weakened to the point” where it could no longer function, and if U.S. measures 
have “so tightened the noose” that bin Laden could no longer communicate with his 
operatives, then the government has met its “goal of protecting America” (Mikkelson, 
2009, para. 9–10).  However, since assuming office, President Obama believes al-Qa’ida 
represents a “persistent and evolving threat” (Brennan, 2009, para. 18).  Nevertheless, a 
Gallup poll conducted in July 2009, showed 34% of Americans were “not worried at all” 
about being a victim of terrorism, while 30% were “not too worried” (Morales, 2009, 
para. 2).  Seventy-three percent of those polled said they had a great deal, or fair amount, 
of confidence in the U.S. Government to protect against future acts of terrorism (Morales, 
2009, para. 4). 
These diverse views present a strategy dilemma.  If the latter is true, no change is 
required, as the current strategy must be working.  Whereas, the other views require 
differing approaches in countering the threat—one primarily externally focused, and the 
other domestically.  Determining the nature of the threat is extremely important, as the 
strategy to address one can actually serve as the catalyst for radicalization of another, as 
in the case of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Besides, coercive operations 
 4
used to combat terrorists and insurgents in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan offer little utility in a homeland 
setting. 
Which of the threat perspectives is correct?  Much like in 2006 and 2007, al-
Qa’ida remains the vanguard of the militant Islamist movement and its most dangerous 
manifestation.  That said, although al-Qa’ida has managed to reconstitute some of its pre-
9/11 operational capabilities in the FATA, there is no denying the U.S. and its allies have 
degraded al-Qa’ida’s ability to attack the homeland.  Since September 2001, key 
personnel have been captured or killed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Iraq, 
and the Philippines (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2008 and 2009a).  
The current U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) campaign in the border region of 
Afghanistan and the FATA  is credited with killing several high-level al-Qaida 
operatives, planners, trainers, and propagandists4, along with bin Laden’s son, Saad 
(Herridge, 2009).  One of al-Qa’ida’s top propagandists, Abu Yahya al-Libi, has even 
acknowledged the impact of the UAV attacks in his recently released Guide to the Laws 
Regarding Muslim Spies (2009) (Levine and Herridge, 2009).  Yet, “despite these 
successes, al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and allies remain dangerous and adaptive enemies” 
(Blair, 2009, 6). 
Furthermore, al-Qa’ida’s ability to incite or radicalize has not diminished.  This is 
evident by the number of homegrown militant Islamist plots executed or disrupted in 
Europe and North America and the outflow of persons to fight in places like Somalia.  
Even if al-Qa’ida has suffered operational setbacks, the “war on terror” is more than just 
a battle of arms; it is also a battle of ideas.  Until it is countered, militant Islamist rhetoric 
will continue to influence individuals to take action.  As the examples of U.S.-based 
Islamist extremism show, a direct linkage to al-Qa’ida for training or financial purposes 
is no longer a prerequisite. 
                                                 
4 Khalid Habib, Abu Layth al-Libi, Usama al-Kini, Rashid Rauf, Abu Khabab al-Masri, Abdallah 
Azzam, Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi, Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri, Abu Jihad al-Masri, Sheikh Ahmed Salim 
Swedan, and Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri (Blair, 2009; Herridge, 2009). 
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Thus, al-Qa’ida remains a viable threat, both directly and indirectly.  Until al-
Qa’ida no longer has a safe haven, it will continue to pose a threat to the U.S., both 
operationally and inspirationally.  Even without al-Qa’ida, as long as there are believers 
of militant ideologies, homegrown extremism will be a threat.  Based on the assumption 
that both threat streams will co-exist for the near future, one has to ask, is the Nation’s 
overall counterterrorism strategy adequate to address both?  If not, what threat should the 
national strategies related to homeland security and combating terrorism focus on? 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the nature of the terrorist threat to homeland security, what strategy 
represents the most balanced approach to counter?  To answer this overarching question, 
three ancillary questions need addressing.  What is the nature of the threat facing the 
U.S.?  What are the ramifications of simply revising the current strategies related to 
homeland security and counterterrorism to incorporate an increased understanding of the 
enemy?  What alternative strategies are there to counter the threat? 
C. ARGUMENT: MAIN CLAIMS, WARRANTS, EVIDENCE AND 
CHALLENGES 
The question posed at the beginning of the research process was—given the 
terrorist threat to homeland security, what strategy represents the most balanced 
approach?  An instrumental task, required prior to answering this question, is determining 
the true nature of the threat.  As noted in the Problem Statement, correctly characterizing 
the threat is extremely important, as the strategy to address one threat can actually serve 
as the catalyst for radicalization of another. 
The literature review shows that key aspects of the threat, as envisaged in 2006 
and 2007, remain.  Al-Qa’ida as an organization is still a valid and persistent threat and 




inspired by a common ideology.  Based on the assumption that both threat streams will 
co-exist for at least the near future, the crucial question is—are the existing national 
strategies adequate to address both or is a new strategy required? 
As a starting point, The 9/11 Commission Report provides the initial planning 
guidance concerning the objectives of the Nation’s overall counterterrorism strategy.  
“Our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and 
prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism” 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission), 
2007, 363).  The NSCT supports this directive by calling for destruction of al-Qa’ida and 
countering the radical ideology inspiring recruitment and support for the group (White 
House, 2006).  If one believes al-Qa’ida is no longer the threat as envisaged in 2006, they 
could argue the current strategies are sufficient.  However, if the greater threat to the 
homeland is self-generating extremists, the current strategies are off target. 
With ten national strategy documents related to homeland security and combating 
terrorism (discussed in Chapter II), it would seem the 9/11 Commission’s intent was met.  
Unfortunately, most of the strategies focus on specific areas.  Furthermore, as the 
literature review shows, the two overarching strategies, the NSCT and the NSHS, do not 
provide a balanced approach.  Specifically, they fail to adequately address how to counter 
the radicalization process that is persuading individuals to conduct terrorist acts.  The 
NSCT primarily has an outward focus and does not address the homegrown threat, nor 
does it address how to actually counter the radicalization process, domestically or 
internationally.  Although the NSHS addresses the need to prevent domestic 
radicalization, related objectives are not covered in any detail, nor does it articulate how 
to accomplish these objectives.  Based on these issues, one could argue that at a 
minimum, the NSCT and the NSHS require updating to address how to counter the 
homegrown self-radicalization phenomenon.  However, simply revising these documents 
may not be enough. 
 
 7
Counterterrorism strategies typically focus on “offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorist acts” (U.S. Department of Defense 
[DoD], 2008, 132).  As is the case with the current U.S. strategies, they tend to focus 
primarily on security and law enforcement measures.  While such strategies can be 
effective in containing a threat, a heavy-handed response (perceived or actual) may incite 
others to act, as with U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  Based on this 
unintended consequence, at times a non-security based, or non-coercive, approach is a 
better option, particularly if the goal is preventing domestic radicalization. 
Compared to our European allies, the U.S. has not experienced the levels of 
radicalization among its population resulting from the militant ideology being espoused 
by groups like al-Qa’ida.  This is based on the perception that Muslims have had an 
easier time assimilating in American society (Silber and Bhatt, 2007).  Many of the 
sources and testimony attribute the reason for this is mainly due to the economic 
opportunities this country provides.  However, based on the number of disrupted 
homegrown terrorist plots and recent polling data, there are indications that this may no 
longer be the case.  In fact, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has stated that he is 
increasingly concerned about Americans becoming radicalized and turning to terrorism 
(Pierre, Ryan, and Cook, 2009).  The radicalization issue does not appear to be limited to 
any specific religious or ethnic classification.  Since 2001, there has also been a 
significant increase in the number of right-wing and hate groups in the U.S. (Holthouse, 
2009). 
If the U.S. economy continues to weaken, segments of American society could 
become even more disenfranchised and, in a worst-case scenario, use violence to act out 
their frustrations.  If this were to happen, the threat to homeland security would be far 
more significant than any externally-based terrorist threat, as the threat is already here.  
Since the threat is increasingly consisting of “self recruited wannabes” (Sageman, 2008b, 
37) and a portion of the American population holds radical views, instead of revising the 
existing national strategies, a more practical solution is the creation of a preventive 
strategy focusing on countering radicalization in the homeland. 
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However, implementing a counterradicalization strategy is not without risk.  
Some aspects could infringe on the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.  Other aspects, if 
not executed correctly, could actually facilitate the delivery of the extremist message.  A 
national counterradicalization strategy will most certainly have to take into account a 
wide variety of constitutional, legal, and foreign policy issues. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The research adds to the national discussion regarding the terrorist threat facing 
the U.S., and how best to counter it.  Determining the nature of the threat is vital, as the 
strategy to address one can actually serve as the catalyst for radicalization of another, as 
demonstrated by U.S. military operations overseas.  The analysis of current strategies 
related to homeland security and counterterrorism will help to determine if the Nation’s 
strategies are appropriate to address the threat, or if there is unintended risk.  An 
assessment of the international approaches to countering radicalization will help to 
identify any lessons learned that could be incorporated into a U.S. strategy. 
The consumers of this research are homeland security practitioners and leaders at 
all levels (federal, state, and local).  Additionally, academic institutions will benefit from 
the research by having an increased understanding of the threat and related homeland 
security policies (domestic and foreign), allowing them to better focus their programs to 
develop innovative means to address the terrorist threat facing the U.S. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is structured as a policy analysis, following the methodology proposed 
in A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis (Bardach, 2007). 
Building on the initial literature review (Chapter II), an exploratory study will be 
conducted to further define the true nature of the terrorist threat (foreign and domestic) 
facing the U.S. (Chapter III) and the causes of radicalization (Chapter IV) to determine 
how to best counter.  Once the nature of the threat and the key sources of radicalization 
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are defined, the current U.S. strategies related to counterterrorism and homeland security 
will be analyzed (Chapter V) to evaluate if they are adequate to address the threat.  Part 
of the analysis will be an assessment of how these strategies, in the collective sense, meet 
the 9/11 Commission recommendation of a “balanced strategy.”  Additionally, a 
comparative analysis of the various international approaches (Chapter VI) will be 
accomplished to determine if there are any lessons learned that could be incorporated into 
a U.S. strategy. 
If the existing strategies are determined to be deficient, a new strategy will be 
proposed using the criteria established in the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) Report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 
Strategies Related to Terrorism (2004). 
F. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
Some may argue that the various disrupted homegrown terrorist plots are an 
anomaly and Shirwa Ahmed is the exception.  However, the facts suggest otherwise.  
Ahmed did not travel to Somalia alone.  The number of Somali Americans believed to 
have departed for Somalia is over twenty (Meryhew, et al., 2009, para. 4).  This is not an 
isolated example.  In July 2009, seven North Carolina residents (six U.S. citizens and one 
naturalized) were arrested for conspiring to commit terrorist acts overseas (U.S. 
Attorney's Office, Eastern District of North Carolina, 2009).  This adds an additional, and 
interesting, twist to the issue of radicalization and transnational terrorism.  As reflected in 
the national-level strategy documents, radicalization is closely linked to the transnational 
threat.  However, this is in the context of groups like al-Qa’ida inspiring others to strike 
the U.S.  Now the U.S. is starting to witness cases of domestic radicalization being 
exported overseas.  What happens should these combat-hardened, radicalized individuals 
decide to come home?  This is an issue that U.S. Attorney General Holder believes “is a 
great concern” (Pierre, et al., 2009, para. 2).  Is the Nation’s counterterrorism strategy 
adaptable enough to address a change in the threat that is fundamentally different from 
that envisaged in 2006 and 2007? 
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The Nation’s counterterrorism and homeland security strategies do not appear to 
provide a balanced approach in countering the threat as recommended by the 9/11 
Commission.  Specifically, they failed to address how to counter the radicalization 
process persuading individuals to conduct terrorism, domestically or internationally.  
Even more importantly, they failed to prevent individuals like Ahmed and those arrested 
in North Carolina from becoming radicalized in the first place.  Given the radicalizing 
dynamic of military operations in places like Iraq and foreign policy decisions involving 
countries like Somalia, it is time to rethink the country’s approach to countering 
terrorism.  Instead of primarily focusing on dismantling groups and networks like al-
Qa’ida, it is time to focus on the Ahmeds, before they stop going overseas and decide to 
take action here. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A significant amount of literature regarding terrorism and radicalization has been 
produced since September 2001, some of which is original and thought provoking, some 
repetitive, and some controversial.  As can be expected, a considerable portion of the 
material focuses on al-Qa’ida and other militant Islamist organizations.  Admittedly, 
these groups do not represent the sole terrorist threat to the U.S.  However, many of the 
key trends and issues emanating from this threat can be used as a basis to analyze non-
Islamist groups (e.g., right-wing and special-interest) as well.  As such, this literature 
review tends to focus mainly on the militant Islamist threat that has touched virtually all 
geographical regions. 
For the purpose of this review, the literature will be divided into nine sub-
categories: 1) the threat posed by al-Qa’ida; 2) the evolution and devolution of al-Qa’ida; 
3) the Internet’s impact on terrorism and radicalization; 4) U.S. Government efforts to 
counter extremist use of the Internet; 5) the root causes of radicalization; 6) the potential 
for radicalization in the U.S.; 7) U.S. strategies related to combating terrorism and 
homeland security; 8) U.S. Government efforts to counter radicalization; and 9) 
international perspectives on countering radicalization. 
A. THREAT POSED BY AL-QA’IDA 
When last updated, the NSCT depicted the threat as a transnational movement.  
This movement was not considered monolithic or “controlled by any single individual, 
group, or state” (White House, 2006, 5).  Rather, the unifying force was “a common 
vision, a common set of ideas” (White House, 2006, 5).  Both the NSCT and NSHS saw 
al-Qa’ida as the vanguard of this movement and, along with its affiliations and those 
inspired by them, the most dangerous component.  Both the NSCT and NSHS noted that 
the threat was constantly adjusting in response to the Nation’s counterterrorism and 
security measures.  As a result, terrorist networks were becoming less centralized and 
more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology (White House, 2006, 4).  
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Given this transformation, it is necessary to “continue to advance our understanding of 
these threats so we are better able to safeguard the American people” (Homeland Security 
Council, 2007, 9) and to “refine our strategy to meet the evolving threat” (White House, 
2006, 1). 
It has been three years since the publication of the NSCT and almost two for the 
NSHS.  A reasonable question to ask is, has the threat drastically changed?  To help 
answer this question, there are several open source intelligence assessments available. 
Like the NSCT and NSHS, the most current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland (National Intelligence Council [NIC], 2007) 
claimed the U.S. faces a persistent and evolving threat from Islamic radical groups, 
especially al-Qa’ida.  This NIE also addressed the decentralized aspect of the threat by 
acknowledging the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries, 
including in the U.S.  It also stated “globalization trends and recent technological 
advances will continue to enable even small numbers of alienated people to...mobilize 
resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training 
camp, or leader” (NIC, 2007, 6). 
Other national-level assessments during this period support both aspects of the 
threat.  According to Michael McConnell (2008), then Director of the National 
Intelligence (DNI), during testimony before the U.S. House, Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, al-Qa’ida and its affiliates continued to pose a significant threat to the 
U.S., and its central leadership was its “most dangerous component”  Director McConnell 
(2008) also claimed, “Attacks by ‘homegrown’ extremists inspired by militant Islamic 
ideology but without operational direction from al-Qa’ida will remain a threat.”  Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2007 (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2008) 
reported there was a “substantial increase in the number of self-identified groups.” 
The dual nature of the threat has carried over into the most recent national-level 
unclassified intelligence assessment.  Director Dennis Blair (2009), the current DNI, 
during testimony to the U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, stated “al-Qa’ida 
and its affiliates and allies remain dangerous and adaptive enemies, and remains intent on 
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attacking U.S. interests worldwide, including the U.S. Homeland.”  Director Blair (2009) 
was also “concerned about the potential for homegrown extremists inspired by al-
Qa’ida’s militant ideology to plan attacks inside the United States, Europe, and elsewhere 
without operational direction from the group itself.” 
While the dual nature of the threat remains, a noticeable change in the most recent 
assessments is language deemphasizing the operational capability of core al-Qa’ida and 
some of its affiliates.  Director Blair (2009) claimed that due to U.S. and allied targeting 
of al-Qa’ida’s leadership in the FATA and the decline of “al-Qa’ida’s most prominent 
regional affiliate in Iraq, al-Qa’ida today is less capable and effective than it was a year 
ago.”  Director Blair (2009) also discussed how al-Qa’ida is starting to face “significant 
public criticism from prominent religious leaders and fellow extremists” regarding the 
use of tactics (especially by its affiliates) that have resulted in Muslim deaths.  Similarly, 
in Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, it was assessed that al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates 
continued “to lose ground, both structurally and in the court of world public opinion” 
(Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009a, 8). 
The significance of the blow back from its “franchised” operations is not just 
limited to public perceptions.  One crack in the al-Qa’ida organization that could help to 
further undermine its operational capability, and to some extent its legitimacy, appeared 
in July 2009, when the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) announced its 
disassociation from al-Qa’ida and criticized “wrongful practices like random bombings, 
destroying private and public property, and targeting civilians” (NEFA Foundation, 
2009b, 2).  Just as significant, this announcement also criticized former LIFG alumni Abu 
Yahiya al-Libi for his involvement with al-Qa’ida. 
Similarly, mainstream elements of the Indonesian Islamist group Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) (which gained worldwide recognition for the Bali bombings of 2002 and 
2005) appeared to be distancing themselves from al-Qa’ida.  Like the LIFG, these 
elements were encouraging members not to participate in indiscriminate violence.  
According to one of the leaders, the Bali bombings damaged the image of the 
organization and were a disservice to Islam (Ismail and Ungerer, 2009).  Ironically, the 
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day before the Jakarta bombings on July 17, 2009, the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute released a report addressing JI’s fracturing, and that, combined with the release 
of former JI members from prison, who had not been properly rehabilitated, could 
increase the risk of attacks (Ismail and Ungerer, 2009).  One of these splinter groups, 
calling itself al-Qa'ida in the Malay Archipelago (led by former JI member Noordin 
Mohammed Top), claimed responsibility for the Jakarta attack (Fitzpatrick, 2009). 
Believing in a common goal does not necessarily mean there is a common vision 
in how it may be accomplished.  The fractures among JI membership reflect this point, 
and should be a concern for al-Qa’ida’s leadership.  One of the underlying issues for JI’s 
problems is a perceived lack of action among its hardliners, who refer to moderate 
members as “NATO” (No Action, Talk Only) (Ismail and Ungerer, 2009).  Similar 
discontent has been noted within the ranks of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
where indiscriminate violence also seems to be driving an organizational split (Stewart 
and Burton, 2009b).  It would not be a stretch to think that other affiliates, or individuals, 
have a similar perception of al-Qa’ida’s central leadership due to the absence of a 
significant attack. 
While all the issues addressed help to support an assessment regarding the 
potentially declining operational capability of al-Qa’ida, a very real concern is how these 
organizational splits and individual defections will influence the nature of the threat.  One 
fear is the “boomerang effect” of militants returning home from places like Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia, who are not only battle hardened, but have 
developed insurgent tradecraft skills making them more lethal than prior to their 
departure (Stewart and Burton, 2009b).  With the new generation of the militant 
Islamists, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (deceased leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq), Baitullah 
Mehsud (deceased leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), and Noordin Top (killed by 
Indonesian Security Forces at time of publication (Associated Press, 2009)), the tendency 
appears to be for the fringe elements to be even more violent than those who preceded 
them. 
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Despite the changes to the strategic operating environment over the past year, the 
threat posed by al-Qa’ida is not insignificant.  If anything, the organizational 
fragmentation adds an even more lethal aspect to the threat.  To better understand the 
implications of a greater shift toward a more decentralized conglomeration, it is 
necessary to take a more in-depth look at al-Qa’ida as an organization. 
B. EVOLUTION AND DEVOLUTION OF AL-QA’IDA 
While there are increasing indicators that core al-Qa’ida is operationally 
degraded, history has shown the group’s ability to weather previous setbacks.  That said, 
when looking at past examples, one must also take into account that today’s strategic 
operating environment is far different from the pre-9/11 environment, allowing al-Qa’ida 
to morph into a global movement.  Al-Qa’ida's ability to survive and adapt has been 
largely dependent on access to a safe haven.  Pre-9/11 al-Qa’ida operated unimpeded in 
Sudan and then Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.  Al-Qa’ida was able to avoid 
annihilation by U.S. forces by shifting operations to a new safe haven in the FATA.  Now 
even this safe haven is increasingly coming under pressure through a combination of the 
U.S.’s UAV campaign and a seemingly reenergized Pakistani counterinsurgency 
campaign directed at the Pakistani Taliban.  However, even if al-Qa’ida was to lose this 
base of operations, it does not necessarily minimize the threat due to the ongoing 
evolution of the organization, combined with the impact of the Internet.  Both of these 
factors have served to minimize the requirement of having a physical safe haven for 
traditional training camps or direct interaction with al-Qa’ida leadership. 
Sageman believes the threat the U.S. faces has significantly changed from the old 
al-Qa’ida.  He argues the new generation of “jihadists” consists of “homegrown 
wannabes-self-recruited, without leadership, and globally connected through the Internet” 
(Sageman, 2008b, 37).  Sageman characterizes this as an offshoot of al-Qa’ida's latest 
evolutionary stage, but it may actually represent the next stage of the militant Islamist 
movement. 
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Al-Qa’ida’s first generation consisted of those fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan 
during the 1980s.  The second wave occurred during the 1990s, because of the conflicts 
in Bosnia and Chechnya, and consisted mainly of Middle Eastern students radicalized 
while attending western universities.  The third wave is the post-2001 generation who 
joined because of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Sageman (2008b) sees the 
“leaderless jihad” as a byproduct of the third wave, as it consists mainly of those who 
have found it difficult to join up with core al-Qa’ida due to the success of U.S. 
operations.  Unable to join al-Qa’ida, these individuals use the Internet to form an 
informal, decentralized structure, which may represent an even more dangerous 
operational model. 
Just as al-Qa’ida as an organization has evolved, so has its operational model 
evolved.  The operational models can be categorized as al-Qa’ida 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0 
(Burton, 2006).  During the first and second evolutionary waves, operational commanders 
were trained in formal camps (al-Qa’ida 1.0), received funding and logistical support, and 
were deployed abroad to form cells to conduct attacks (e.g., 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 
USS Cole attack).  At the end of the second wave, the operational model (al-Qa’ida 2.0) 
consisted of the training and deploying of an entire cell, as in the case of the 9/11 
attackers.  Given the change in the global security environment that led to the third 
evolutionary wave and the difficultly of deploying intact teams, al-Qa’ida focused on 
inspiring homegrown cells (al-Qa’ida 3.0) that did not have to forward deploy (e.g., the 
Madrid and London bombings).  While the leaders of these operations may have had 
some formalized training or contact with core al-Qaida, they were not operationally 
deployed as with the 1.0 and 2.0 models.  The latest iteration (al-Qa’ida 4.0) relies on 
homegrown cells inspired by al-Qa’ida but lacks any direct operational interaction. 
Differentiating the operational models is useful in attempting to understand the 
threat, but it should not be mistaken that this is a linear evolution.  Hoffman (2007) sees 




independent thought and action…and a ‘top down’ one—issuing orders and still 
coordinating a far-flung terrorist enterprise” (45).  Within this construct, Hoffman (2007) 
sees four distinct, though not mutually exclusive, categories: 
 “Al-Qa’ida Central”: the core leadership and organization component 
residing  in parts of Afghanistan and the FATA; 
 “Al-Qa’ida Affiliates and Associates”: the various regional groups, some 
of which are “endorsed” by al-Qa’ida and others seeking greater prestige; 
 “Al-Qa’ida Locals”: dispersed cells or individuals that have or had some 
contact with the core and possibly some prior terrorist training; and 
 “Al-Qa’ida Network”: the “homegrown” elements with no contact with 
the core. 
There is no reason to believe that operational models 1.0, 3.0, and 4.0 do not co-exist 
within this structure.  As Hoffman points out, this is exactly how bin Laden envisioned 
the role of al-Qa’ida, as “a base” to inspire, motivate, and radicalize Muslims to join the 
“Islamic revolution” while exercising command and control over its capabilities.  
Besides, mixing and matching organizational and operational styles creates a less 
definable and more unpredictable threat. 
While decentralization has, in theory, given al-Qa’ida a much broader operational 
reach, or at least a perception of a movement capable of striking in any geographical 
region (Europe, Africa, Middle East, South Asia, etc.), this has not come without its 
costs.  In some ways, it could be argued the regional players have started to eclipse al-
Qa’ida.  In the past year alone, the U.S. public has learned from the media about al-
Shabaab, Lashkar-e-Taiba (the Mumbai attack), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (linked to 
Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and the source of multiple threats to the U.S.), and JI 
(Jakarta bombings).  However, as previously pointed out, a common vision does not 
necessarily translate into a common operational picture.  As the DNI testified, the very 
tactics of its proxies in Iraq and North Africa are undermining the support al-Qa’ida 
garnered after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 
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Just as significant is the cost due to the loss of operational depth and expertise that 
had traditionally been available in the centrally managed training camps (Burton, 2006).  
The lack of expertise and experience, combined with significant improvements in the 
global security environment, may account for the high rate of disrupted plots compared to 
those successfully executed. 
Nevertheless, given the number of disrupted homegrown plots within the U.S., the 
significance of al-Qa’ida’s latest evolution has less to do with operational capability then 
its influence on the radicalization process.  The continued release of the videos and 
recordings of bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (al-Qa’ida’s second in command), and al-
Libi still manage to achieve a sizeable amount of global media coverage, indicating al-
Qa’ida is still, and will continue to be, an inspirational influence among groups and 
individuals believing in the greater militant Islamist movement. 
Even if al-Qa’ida’s overall operational capability is diminished, the validity of the 
threat remains as long as it can still inspire others to act.  Besides, organizational 
decentralization, combined with regional fragmentation, further allows the militant 
ideology to spread well beyond Afghanistan and the FATA.  Al-Qa’ida’s ability to 
inspire represents a greater threat than its operational capability, as this not only helps to 
bring replacements into al-Qa’ida, but the larger movement as well.  Just as concerning is 
the fact radicalization is no longer confined to training camps.  The Internet allows 
radicalization to occur anywhere, including the U.S.  Even if al-Qa’ida was to lose its 
geographical safe haven, the Internet offers a virtual safe haven for its militant ideology. 
C. INTERNET’S IMPACT ON TERRORISM AND RADICALIZATION 
Probably one of the most significant technical tools ever made available to 
terrorists is the Internet.  Unlike any period in history, an extremist can contact multiple 
likeminded persons around the world almost instantaneously.  Extremists today have 
managed to integrate the Internet into all aspects of their organizations and operations.  A 
report prepared by the United Nations (UN) Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force 
(CTITF) (2009) Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist 
 19
Purposes, identified the following uses: cyber attacks, fundraising, training, recruitment, 
secret communications, data mining, propaganda, and radicalization.  Of these uses, how 
the Internet has factored into the radicalization process seems to have the greatest 
implications for the U.S. 
The U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
(SCHSGA), chaired by Senators Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, has held several 
hearings concerning a variety of topics related to violent extremism.  The impact of the 
Internet on radicalization was addressed in testimony during the hearing “The Internet: A 
portal to Violent Islamist Extremism” (May 3, 2007).5  The various speakers validated 
the fact that terrorist organizations use the Internet for a variety of purposes including 
propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, training, and operational planning.  However, the 
impact of the Internet goes beyond day-to-day operations.  All the speakers testified that 
the Internet has allowed Islamic extremists to spread their ideology to a much wider 
audience, faster and more effectively than ever before.  The Internet has created a 
condition that makes it possible for an almost virtual terrorist network composed of 
individuals unknown to each other, but united “by the same ideology and willing to 
coordinate actions in pursuit of it” (Doran, 2007, 2).  Besides the operational 
implications, the Internet has also changed how individuals become radicalized. 
Hsinchun Chen, director of the University of Arizona's Artificial Intelligence Lab, 
believes the Internet is “the most powerful tool for spreading extremist violence around 
the world" (Kotler, 2007, para. 4).  A view shared by Frank Cilluffo, Director, Homeland 
Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, who claims, “Internet chat 
rooms are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers and coffee 
shops as venues for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist groups” (Cilluffo, 2007, 1).  
Lawrence Sanchez, Assistant Commissioner of the New York Police Department 
 
                                                 
5 Providing testimony during the hearing were Frank Cilluffo (Director, Homeland Security Policy 
Institute, George Washington University), Michael Doran (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Support 
to Public Policy), and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Felter, PhD (Director of the Combating Terrorism Center 
at the U.S. Military Academy). 
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(NYPD) Intelligence Division, sees the Internet as becoming “the most significant factor 
in the radicalization process in America today” (SCHSGA, 2008, 11).  Sageman (2007) 
argues that online radicalization is replacing face-to-face radicalization. 
The significance of online radicalization should not be underestimated.  As 
demonstrated by the recent election-related turmoil in Iran, social networking tools (e.g., 
Facebook and Twitter postings, and text messages) not only allowed demonstrators to 
organize in short time periods, but also to disseminate information in an environment that 
was, in theory, tightly controlled (Quirk, 2009).  Given the amount of media coverage of 
these applications and their utility, it would be hard to imagine that extremists would not 
further implement these tools into their organizational processes. 
D. U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COUNTER EXTREMIST USE OF 
THE INTERNET 
Despite the increasing importance of the Internet to facilitate operational 
planning, recruitment, and radicalization, the U.S. Government has done little to counter 
extremist use of this medium.  During the May 3, 2007, SCHSGA hearing regarding 
extremist use of the Internet, only one presenter addressed the technical aspect of 
countering extremist use of the Internet.  Cilluffo (2007) identified a need to “deny or 
disrupt extremist access to…the Internet via legal and technical means.”  However, he 
did not offer any solutions.  Regarding the utility of even trying to counter extremist use 
of the Internet, the Director of the Countering Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military 
Academy claimed, “attempts to shut down Web sites have proven as fruitless as a game 
of whack-a-mole” (Felter, 2007, 8).  The inability of the Iranian government to 





Following the May 3, 2007, hearing, the SCHSGA held another on “Violent 
Islamic Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It” (May 10, 2007).6  Of those 
providing testimony, only one discussed an ongoing technical-based solution.  Jeremy 
Curtin (2007) described the Bureau of International Information Programs’ Digital 
Outreach Team and Arabic web-based programs, which were established to provide a 
U.S. Government presence in Arabic cyberspace, and to ensure U.S. policies are included 
in ideological debates.  While a virtual outreach program might be a good tool to address 
the broader Islamic community, it is unfortunately highly unlikely to find its way onto 
any extremist Web page or chat room.  Based on these hearings and available 
unclassified sources, it appears U.S. Government efforts to thwart extremism on the 
Internet are minimal to non-existent (based on the unclassified literature available).  Of 
the measures addressed, they were outward focused and did not take into account for the 
homegrown aspect of the threat (Chapter VII discusses the challenges of doing this in the 
U.S.). 
In 2008, the SCHSGA released Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the 
Homegrown Terrorist Threat, which provides a summary of the key findings resulting 
from the committee's various hearings up to that point in time.  The report concluded, 
“To defeat the homegrown terrorist threat requires an array of government resources in 
addition to traditional classified counterterrorism tools and tactics used by the 
intelligence and law enforcement communities” (SCHSGA, 2008, 16).  However, as 
reflected in the testimony provided to the committee, the report did not offer any 
technical solutions.  Rather, it ended with the following question: “What, if any, new 
laws, resources and tactics other than those already employed by intelligence and law 
enforcement should be used to prevent the spread of the ideology in the United States” 
(SCHSGA, 2008, 16)?  Instead of focusing on preventing the spread of the ideology, a 
more appropriate question might be how can you make people less receptive to the 
                                                 
6 Providing testimony during the hearing, were John Miller (Assistant Director, Office of Public 
Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation), Chip Poncy (Director, Office of Strategic Policy for Terrorist 
Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of Treasury, Jeremy Curtin (Coordinator, Bureau of 
International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State), and Jeffrey Grieco (acting Assistant 
Administrator for Legislative and Public Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development). 
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ideology’s message?  An ideology does not influence behavior in a vacuum, it “can only 
impact behavior under given conditions, when other necessary factors are present” 
(Moghaddam, 2008, 2). 
E. ROOT CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION 
To discuss the sources of radicalization, the SCHSGA held two hearings, one 
entitled “The Threat of Islamic Radicalism to the Homeland” (March 14, 2007)7, the 
other, “The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It” (July 10, 
2008).8  As could be expected, much of the testimony focused on the militant Islamist 
ideology fueling the radicalization process and some of the sources of this ideology. 
For the most part, modern Islamism9 dates back to 1928, when Hasan al-Bana 
established the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Mandaville, 2008).  However, modern 
Islamism was not established as an inherently militant ideology.  It was not until being 
forced underground by the Egyptian government in the 1950s that the Muslim 
Brotherhood became more radicalized (Mandaville, 2008).  Consequently, it was during 
this time, one of the key ideologues of radical Islamism, Sayyid Qutb, emerged.  His 
ideas provided the ideological underpinnings for many of today’s militant Islamist 
groups, and helped to influence the movement’s key figures, such as bin Laden and al-
Zawhari (Leiter, 2008). 
 
                                                 
7 Providing testimony during the hearing, were the Honorable Michael Chertoff  (Secretary of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)), Charles E. Allen (Under Secretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, DHS), David W. Sutherland (Officer for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS). 
8 Providing testimony during the hearing, were Maajid Nawaz (Director, Quilliam Foundation), Peter 
P. Mandaville, PhD (Associate Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University), Zeyno 
Baran (Senior Fellow and Director of Center for Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute), Fathali M. 
Moghaddam, PhD (Professor, Department of Psychology,  Georgetown University), and Michael E. Leiter 
(Director, National Counterterrorism Center). 
9 While the ideological underpinnings of modern Islamism date back to the early 20th century, the 
theological foundation can be traced back to medieval theologians like Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328) 
(Hutchings, 2009). 
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As with al-Qa’ida today, Qutb’s theories appealed only to a fringe minority as 
most Muslims regarded his views as unorthodox when compared to traditional 
interpretations (Mandaville, 2008).  Nevertheless, his radical views continue to serve as a 
basis for increasing radicalism within segments of the Islamist movement.  Take for 
example, the Muslim Brotherhood.  As this group took a more conciliatory approach 
toward the Egyptian government, the more radical elements chose to split off and form 
even more recalcitrant and violent groups, such as al-Jihad (also known as Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad)10 and  al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group).  This is also the same 
reasoning behind al-Shabaab’s split from its parent organization, the Islamic Courts 
Union (Menkhaus, 2009).  It would appear that the fractional issues currently affecting 
groups like JI and AQIM are a reoccurring problem with the broader Islamist movement 
as well.  Thus, one cannot simply attribute Islamist ideology in itself as the sole driving 
factor fueling radicalization among Muslim youths. 
A theme common throughout the testimony provided to the SCHSGA, is that 
ideology is not necessarily the key factor.  As already pointed out, while an ideology can 
influence behavior, other factors are typically present, as it is rare for individuals to 
commit acts of violence for purely ideological reasons (Moghaddam, 2008; Baran, 2008).  
Rather, young Muslims who engage in militant activities usually do so for a combination 
of ideological and social reasons.  As in the case of individuals joining al-Shabaab, 
motivations consist of a combination of “nationalist, Islamist, anti-Ethiopian, anti-
American, anti-Western, anti-foreigner sentiments” (Menkhaus, 2009, 4).  In fact, there is 
evidence to suggest that many individuals move into radical circles after already deciding 
they want to engage in some form of confrontational politics (Mandaville, 2008).  Thus, 
it is not the ideology that serves as the “radicalizing agent,” but rather personal 
experiences, and worldviews.  Personal frustrations, perceived social injustice, and other 
grievances can lead individuals to be more receptive to alternative perspectives. 
 
                                                 
10 Established by Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
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It is when one begins to look at why individuals decide to conduct acts of 
terrorism that things become even more complicated.  The leading psychosocial theories 
include a broad range of sociological, psychological and psychiatric approaches.  
However, trying to evaluate the various theories to find the answer to “why” is difficult at 
best.  The problem is that most of the research has not been tested in a systematic way 
(Victoroff, 2005).  According to terrorism expert Andrew Silke (2001), “terrorism 
research is not in a healthy state.  It exists on a diet of fast-food research: quick, cheap, 
ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious.”  Nonetheless, there are two useful reports that 
attempt to synthesize the various psychological and sociology theories: Psychology of 
Terrorism (Borum, 2004) and The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who 
Becomes A Terrorist and Why? (Hudson, 1999).  These reports go into some detail 
regarding the various psychological theories, but ultimately conclude there are no 
detectable personality traits that would allow one to identify a terrorist. 
Despite a common belief that terrorists are psychopaths, most research into 
terrorist psychology concludes they are “normal” and do not suffer from psychotic 
disorders (Post, 2007).  Based on the research, there also appears to be no evidence of 
individual psychological traits that would distinguish terrorists from the general 
population (Taylor and Horgan, 2006; Post, Ali, Henderson, Shafield, Victoroff, and 
Weine, 2009).  Terrorism expert, Martha Crenshaw (1981), found in her research that the 
most “common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.”  Even suicide bombers have 
not been found to be psychologically abnormal or seriously pathological, and their 
actions and motives seem to have many parallels with “normal depression and normal 
suicide” (Speckhard, 2008).  As such, just like normal behavior, terrorist behavior is 
“determined by a combination of innate factors, biological factors, early developmental 
factors, cognitive factors, temperament, environmental influences, and group dynamics” 
(Victoroff, 2005, 34).  Based on the evidence, there does not appear to be a common 
terrorist mindset, even among members of the same movement (Horgan, 2008).  
Therefore, there is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence agencies in 
determining who is prone to radicalization. 
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Yet, despite this evidence, counterterrorism efforts still rely on the use of profiles 
(Horgan, 2008), which from a policy perspective is problematic.  By focusing efforts on 
seeking a common psychological profile, one may not identify other factors contributing 
to radicalization.  The tendency to characterize terrorists as “crazy,” “evil,” or of the 
same mindset, diminishes the psychological, social, political, and economic conditions 
that culminate in a situation triggering some individuals to conduct a terrorist act, 
whereas these contributing factors may be of more significance. 
There is a body of evidence supporting the theory that “situations exert more 
power over human actions” (Zimbardo, 2004, 46–47) than internal determinants.  In fact, 
as well supported in the book The Lucifer Effect (Zimbardo, 2008), the impact of special 
circumstances can make ordinary people do “evil” things; a fact clearly demonstrated by 
the Stanford prison experiment and the Milgram obedience studies.  What the research 
tends to indicate is that “any individual, anywhere, at any time, can become an active 
terrorist” (Zimbardo, 2008, 4). 
It would appear, then, radicalization is largely a function of the environment in 
which people live.  Men and woman join terrorist groups for multiple reasons (e.g., 
psychosocial, economic, religious, nationalistic and political reasons) and for the most 
part share the same motivations (Speckhard, 2008).  However, an individual’s motivation 
for conducting an act of terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism, varies depending upon if 
the individual is living within or outside a conflict zone (Speckhard, 2007).  Inside the 
conflict zone, motivations are based on trauma, revenge, humiliation, and basic survival 
needs.  In non-conflict zones, motivations for becoming involved in terrorism tend to 
focus on personal issues of social alienation, marginalization, lack of positive identity, a 
desire for a meaningful life, and heroism, as would likely be the case for Americans 
vulnerable to radicalization.  As such, a strategy for countering radicalization in the 
homeland needs to focus on these factors. 
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F. POTENTIAL FOR RADICALIZATION IN THE U.S. 
The vast majority of Muslims worldwide reject militant Islamist ideology, 
particularly its extreme interpretation of Islam and justifications for violence (Leiter, 
2008).  Muslims living in the U.S. are no different.  According to a Pew Research Center 
report (2007), approximately 2.35 million Muslims11 live in the U.S. (850,000 under the 
age of 18) (10).  Sixty-five percent of this population was born elsewhere (Pew Research 
Center, 2007, 1).  Despite this, nearly half see themselves as an American first, rather 
than a Muslim, and hold mainstream U.S. outlooks, values, and attitudes (Pew Research 
Center, 2007, 3). 
While Muslim Americans typically express positive views of American society, 
the Pew Research Center (2007) found that 53% felt life for Muslims was more difficult 
since September 11, 2001 (Pew Research Center, 2007, 2).  There was also a perception 
that U.S. Government counterterrorism efforts singled out Muslims.  For this reason, 
many Muslim Americans opposed military operations in Iraq (75%) and Afghanistan 
(48%) (Pew Research Center, 2007, 4).  Despite these beliefs, it appears extremism is still 
lower among Muslim Americans compared to Muslims around the world. 
According to a 2008 Gallup poll of Muslims from around the world, 7% of those 
surveyed supported anti-U.S. terrorism (Esposito and Mogahed, 2008, 48).  A more 
recent poll released by WorldPublicOpinion.org (2009) showed a slightly higher average 
(9.5%)12 in support of attacks against American civilians, with an additional 10% 
displaying mixed feelings (5).  Comparatively, 1% of the Muslims living in the U.S. 
believe suicide bombings against civilian targets are often justified to defend Islam; 
 
 
                                                 
11 The number of Muslims in the U.S. varies greatly depending on source and political agendas.  
Estimates range from 1.5 million to 7 million (ReligiousTolerance.Org,, 2006).  A September 2009 press 
article estimated American Muslims make up fewer than 2% of the total U.S. population (Ahmed, 2009, 
para. 2).  Neither of these sources provided substantiating data for their numbers.  Lacking current census 
figures (last official census was conducted in 2000), the Pew Research data is the most current and will 
serve as the  reference point for this thesis. 
12 Countries polled: Egypt (8%), Indonesia (5%), Pakistan (9%), Morocco (7%), Palestinian Territory 
(24%), Jordan (11%), Turkey (8%), and Azerbaijan (4%) (WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2009, p. 5). 
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however, 7% believe bombings are sometimes justified (Pew Research Center, 2007, 5).  
While the numbers are low, this evidence, plus the disruption of multiple terrorist plots, 
shows a percentage of Muslim Americans is prone to radicalization. 
One last point in discussing the potential for radicalization in the U.S. is the 
tendency to group all Muslims together.  The Muslim American population does not 
represent a monolithic diaspora; rather it is made up of multiple diasporic communities 
(e.g., Somali, Lebanese Yemeni, Iraqi, Iranian, Palestinian, etc.), each with its own 
unique cultural, social, and political context (Post and Sheffer, 2007).  Then, there are 
Muslim converts with no ties at all to a Muslim nation or diaspora.  Given these facts, a 
strategy to address radicalization needs to focus on the uniqueness of the affected 
communities and individuals, not treat them as a common entity.  The next step is to look 
at how national strategies address this potential internal threat. 
G. NATIONAL STRATEGIES RELATED TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
COMBATING TERRORISM 
There are ten national strategy documents related to homeland security and 
combating terrorism: 
 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006); 
 National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007); 
 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (2006); 
 National Defenses Strategy (2006); 
 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004); 
 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002); 
 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Assets (2003); 
 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003); 
 National Money Laundering Strategy (2007); and 
 National Strategy for Information Sharing (2008). 
Of these, the NSCT and the NSHS are the most relevant in the discussion of the 
homegrown terrorist threat and countering radicalization.  The other strategies focus 
primarily on military operations abroad or the protection of critical infrastructure. 
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Starting with the NSCT, this document primarily has an outward focus and barely 
mentions the homegrown threat.  Language regarding the homeland is primarily 
defensive in nature, such as “defend potential targets of attack” and “deny terrorists entry 
to the United States and disrupt their travel internationally” (White House, 2006, 13).  
From a domestic aspect, “we will continue to guard against the emergence of homegrown 
terrorists within our own Homeland” (White House, 2006, 10).  To accomplish this 
strategy, “we will continue to engage with, and strengthen, the efforts of Muslims” 
(White House, 2006, 11) in the U.S., to reject violent extremism.  How to accomplish 
these goals is lacking, and it is implied homegrown radicalization will be resolved by 
counter radicalization abroad. 
References to countering radicalization in the NSCT center around the need to 
“advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism” 
and “lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the 
fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success” (White House, 2006, 
1).  Nowhere does it address how to actually counter the radicalization process, 
internationally or domestically. 
As for the NSHS, it does acknowledge the U.S. “is not immune to homegrown 
radicalization and violent Islamic extremism” (Homeland Security Council, 2008, 3).  It 
also goes beyond Islamic extremism to include right-wing and special-issue groups.  
Despite the broader definition of the terrorist threat, the strategy’s focus is still on the 
Islamic threat and Muslim communities.  While the NSHS identifies four objectives to 
help prevent radicalization, like the NSCT, it does not go into any detail on how to 
accomplish them. 
H. U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COUNTER RADICALIZATION 
Possibly reflecting the deficiencies identified with the U.S. counterterrorism and 
homeland security strategy documents, during the SCHSGA hearing, “Violent Islamist 
Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It,” of the four testimonies, only the FBI 
addressed radicalization in the homeland, and this largely dealt with the Bureau’s Muslim 
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community outreach program.  According to the Bureau, this program has had some 
success, and has created new partnerships in the Arab-American and Muslim 
communities (Miller, 2007). 
Similarly, during the SCHSGA hearing “Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the 
Homeland: Six Years after 9/11” (September 10, 2008),13 there was actually little 
testimony dealing with radicalization.  Rather, the emphasis was on intelligence reform, 
information sharing, and security measures.  As with U.S. strategy, the discussions 
primarily focused on external threats.  Although, Director Mueller (2007) did mention the 
homegrown threat and the FBI’s Muslim community outreach program. 
Using law enforcement as a community outreach tool is a reoccurring theme even 
at the local level.  During a SCHSGA hearing on “The Role of Local Law Enforcement 
in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism” (October 30, 2007)14, representatives from 
the Miami-Dade (Ronczkowski, 2007) and Los Angeles (Downing, 2007) Police 
Departments discussed their outreach efforts.  Both of these outreach efforts tend to focus 
on educating law enforcement personnel on Islamic culture and the public on how to look 
for signs of radicalization.  In short, these programs are more oriented toward identifying 
radicalized individuals than preventing radicalization. 
Community outreach is certainly an important aspect of countering radicalization; 
however, law enforcement might be limited to the inroads they can make into these 
communities.  As the Pew Research Center poll reflected, the majority of the Muslim 
American population is of foreign origin, and most come from countries under 
authoritarian rule.  Based on their experiences, they might be suspicious of the law 
enforcement led programs.  Research conducted following the 9/11 attacks found that 
within some Arab-American communities, individuals “were more afraid of law 
 
                                                 
13 Providing testimony during the hearing were Michael Chertoff (Secretary, DHS), J. Michael 
McConnell (DNI), Robert S. Mueller (Director, FBI), and John Scott Redd (Director, NCTC). 
14 Lawrence Sanchez (Assistant Commissioner, NYPD), Mitchell Silber (Senior Intelligence Analyst, 
NYPD), Deputy Chief Michael Downing (Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau, Los 
Angeles Police Department), Major Michael R. Ronczkowski (Homeland Security Bureau, Miami-Dade 
Police Department), Major Thomas Dailey (Homeland Security Division, Kansas City Police Department). 
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enforcement agencies—especially federal law enforcement agencies—than they were of 
acts of hate or violence, despite an increase in hate crimes” (National Institute for Justice, 
2008, ii). 
Community acceptance aside, the greater issue is that “while there are a series of 
outreach efforts being pursued by federal agencies, those efforts are limited, isolated, and 
not part of a strategic, government-wide policy to significantly minimize the influence” 
(SCHSGA, 2008, 15) of militant Islamic ideology in the U.S.  The U.S. is not alone in 
this deficiency, as there are very few countries with an all-encompassing 
counterradicalization strategy. 
I. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTERING 
RADICALIZATION 
In September 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted a Global Counterterrorism 
Strategy.  To ensure coordination of the Member States’ counterterrorism efforts, the 
CTITF was established.  Supporting the CTITF are nine working groups: 
 Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism, 
 Preventing and Resolving Conflicts, 
 Supporting and Highlighting Victims of Terrorism, 
 Preventing and Responding to WAD Attacks, 
 Tackling the Financing of Terrorism, 
 Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, 
 Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets, 
 Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism, and 
 Addressing Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism. 
The focus of the Radicalization and Extremism working group is to identify non-coercive 




The Radicalization and Extremism Working Group attempted to create an 
inventory of counterradicalization and deradicalization measures implemented by UN 
Member States.  Of the 192 Member States, 3415 provided information on their respective 
policies and programs (CTITF, 2008, 5).  Based on the responses, the Working Group 
identified eleven general categories of counterradicalization programs: 
 engaging and working with civil society, 
 prison programs, 
 education, 
 promoting alliance of civilizations and intercultural dialogue, 
 tackling economic and social inequalities, 
 global programs to counter radicalization, 
 the Internet, 
 legislation reforms, 
 rehabilitation programs, 
 developing and disseminating information, and 
 training and qualifying agencies involved in implementing 
counterradicalization policies. 
These categories reflect a wide range of efforts; unfortunately, the report did not provide 
a significant amount of detail on the various Member States’ programs.  Although, what 
seemed to be noticeably lacking was an overarching strategy addressing all phases of the 
radicalization process, the exception being the UK. 
The UK’s counterterrorism strategy is known as CONTEST.16  CONTEST has 
four components referred to as the “Four Ps:” Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare (Her 
Majesty’s [HM] Government, 2009).  The “Four Ps” are very similar to the objectives 
stated in the NSHS and the NSCT.  The one noticeable difference is the detailed 
                                                 
15 Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Djibouti, Finland, France, Germany, 
Guyana, Iceland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, Sudan, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Switzerland, 
Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Yemen. 
16 Originally published in the 2003, the UK’s strategy was updated in March 2009 and this version is 
sometimes referred to as CONTEST 2. 
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counterradicalization component (Prevent).  In addition to the Prevent section of 
CONTEST, there are other documents further explaining the strategy and defining the 
roles of government and non-government players.  Collectively, these documents offer 
one of the most in depth and detailed strategies to counter radicalization.  Chapter VI will 
go into more detail regarding the Prevent component and look at some of the potential 
issues in implementing such a strategy in the U.S. 
After the UK, the Netherlands offers a significant amount of publicly available 
material on homegrown extremism.  One study in particular, Jihadi terrorists in Europe 
(Bakker, 2006), used the methodology in Sageman’s Understanding Terror Networks 
(2004) to look at radicalization in Europe.  What was interesting is there were more 
dissimilarities than similarities among the extremists analyzed in the two studies (Bakker, 
2006).  Besides differences in age, marital status, and socioeconomic status, probably the 
most significant difference was in the recruitment process.  Whereas, Sagemen’s (2004) 
findings showed  individuals were “recruited” away from their families and friends, 
Bakker’s (2006) research concluded that most European homegrown extremists joined 
with “very limited or even no outside” involvement (51).  Nevertheless, the study seemed 
to validate the “self-recruitment” aspect of the evolving threat found in Sageman’s later 
work. 
Unlike the UK, the Netherlands does not have a series of formalized strategy 
documents.  However, based on papers provided by national and local officials, the Dutch 
appear to have incorporated a similar approach to dealing with radicalization issues.  At 
the national level, similar to the U.S., the major elements of the Dutch counterterrorism 
strategy focus on law enforcement, intelligence, and security measures (Akerboom, 
2003).  At the local level, the efforts appear to parallel the UK’s Prevent component, as it 
focuses on a preventive approach consisting of measures aimed at making individuals 
more resistant to radicalization (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2007). 
Another country that has studied the UK’s counterterrorism strategy is Australia.  
Australia does not have a strategy similar to CONTEST; however, the Australian 
government is currently in the process of drafting a counterterrorism white paper.  In 
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support of this process, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) examined 
CONTEST to determine if there were any lessons to be learned.  The analysis concluded, 
although the homeland security setting was different from the UK’s, the Australian 
government could not afford to be complacent and should create a counter extremism 
strategy (Bergin, 2009).  This recommendation was based on evidence that some 
Australians held extremist views, and some had already traveled overseas to train or 
engage in extremist activities.  Ironically, this report stated that the Australian Federal 
Police had noted extremism among the Somali-Australian population.  On August 4, 
2009, a plot involving four Australians, inspired by al-Shabaab, was disrupted (Stewart 
and Wilson, 2009).  Part of terrorists’ rationale for planning the attacks in Australia was 
that it had become too difficult to travel to Somalia (a point that should not be lost when 
analyzing the Somali-American situation).  This latest event is likely to reenergize the 
debate for a counter radicalization strategy for Australia. 
Closer to home, the Canadian government has also studied CONTEST.  The 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) released a report with their analysis of 
the strategy.  Like the ASPI analysis, the report found that Prevent or any other aspect of  
the UK’s approach was not “transferable wholesale to a Canadian context” (Prevention of 
Radicalization Study Group, 4).  However, it did acknowledge the need for the 
“development of a comprehensive prevention of radicalization strategy” (Prevention of 
Radicalization Study Group, 4).  The CACP report also determined that such a prevention 
strategy must take a “whole-of-government approach that is highly centralized at the 
policy level and highly flexible at the implementation level” (Prevention of 
Radicalization Study Group, 4). 
Attempting to attain lessons learned from other countries, the SCHSGA held the 
hearing on “Violent Islamic Extremism:  The European Experience” (June 27, 2007);
17
 
however, only representatives from France and the Netherlands participated.  The French 
                                                 
17 Providing testimony during the hearing were Lidewijde Ongering (Deputy National Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (The Netherlands)), Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere (First Vice President, Investigating 
Magistrate (France)), Lynn Martin (former U.S. Secretary of Labor), Farooq Kathwari (Chairman and 
CEO, Ethan Allan Interiors, Inc.), and Marc Sageman, PhD. 
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representative’s testimony centered on his country’s legal and judicial measures and did 
not address countering radicalization.  The Dutch representative’s testimony did not go 
into any detail regarding the strategy and approaches previously discussed; however, he 
did stress that the Dutch were seeking a comprehensive, balanced approach that included 
“repressive measures against terrorists, but puts an equal emphasis on prevention” 
(Ongering, 2007, 6).  Lidewijde Ongering (2007) also noted that it is “very important that 
the municipal authorities take the lead in this process,” national authorities should 
provide support where necessary (e.g., providing expertise and guidelines).  Also 
discussed was the importance of using non-traditional means (e.g., social services, 
schools and other institutions) to “help pull radicalized individuals out of their radical 
isolation and offer them other social prospects” (Ongering, 2007, 9). 
J. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
As documented in various intelligence assessments, there is no doubt al-Qa’ida 
and its affiliates pose a threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad.  While the operational 
capability may be diminished, the intent to attack the U.S. remains, and is possibly even 
greater than ever.  Even without a significant attack since 2001, the group is still 
influential among militant Islamists worldwide, as well as, a source of inspiration.  
However, the threat posed by a leaderless, decentralized organization is also valid, as 
particularly observed in the West.  The unfortunate reality is that both threat streams will 
continue for the near future, as such, the Nation’s strategy needs to address both. 
While the devolution of al-Qa’ida can be partially attributed to a conscious 
leadership decision, global counterterrorism measures and U.S. military operations have 
also shaped the operational environment.  The number of key personnel killed is 
significant when measured in the loss of expertise and leadership.  The success of 
military operations in Afghanistan and the FATA has had a secondary affect on the 
organization as well.  In The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of 
Leaderless Organizations (Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006), a means of defeating a 
decentralized or a hybrid organization (containing both centralized and decentralized 
structural elements) is to force it to become more centralized.  The successful U.S. UAV 
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campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan has helped to accomplish this in a figurative sense.  
Al-Libi’s accusatory statements in Guide to the Laws Regarding Muslim Spies reflect the 
level of suspicion18 directed at al-Qa’ida’s Islamist allies.  Given these misgivings, there 
is no reason to doubt al-Qa’ida’s circle of trust has significantly constricted, making it 
more targetable.  With tighter security measures, it is likely operatives have limited 
access (if any) to key decision makers, and decision makers have limited access to 
operational information; both of which impact operational control, placing more reliance 
on regional players and self-radicalizing elements. 
Furthermore, the franchising of operations has not been without its problems.  
Besides the negative attention brought to the militant Islamist movement by affiliates’ use 
of indiscriminate tactics, internal disagreement over these tactics is leading to the 
fracturing of some groups (e.g., JI and AQIM).  This does not mean these splinter groups 
do not pose a threat.  Given the tendency of these fringe elements to take an even more 
violent stance than the original organizations, these smaller groups may actually represent 
a greater threat.  Additionally, access to the Internet allows these fringe elements to reach 
out and inspire individuals and smaller cells globally.  Thus, no longer is face-to-face 
interaction required, individuals can radicalize themselves.  Then there is the possibility 
that members disenfranchised from the larger mainstream organizations may return home 
and link up with these self-radicalizing elements. 
While the majority of “foreign fighters” come from overseas, the issue regarding 
Somali Americans brings this problem closer to home.  However, this problem is not 
limited to one ethnic group.  One of the individuals arrested in North Carolina seeking to 
wage jihad abroad had fought in Afghanistan during the 1980s (U.S. Attorney's Office, 
Eastern District of North Carolina, 2009).  According to a controversial DHS assessment 
leaked to the media, there is concern some veterans returning from deployments in Iraq 
 
                                                 
18 Despite following a similar ideology, Islamist groups have been known to turn on each based on 
group objectives, as in the  case of recent fighting  between HAMAS and a pro al-Qa’ida group, Jund Ansar 
Allah (Soldiers of the Supporters of God), after the leader of Jund Ansar Allah declared an Islamic emirate 
in the Gaza (al-Jazerra English, 2009). 
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and Afghanistan may turn to extremism (Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2009).  All 
these factors point toward a more capable and lethal homegrown threat.  Based on these 
facts, the very nature of the homegrown threat is continuing to evolve. 
Disruption of the radicalization process is even more significant considering the 
nature of the terrorist threat facing the U.S.  No longer is the threat solely from abroad, it 
is now increasingly from within.  Polling data and the disruption of multiple plots 
involving domestic terrorists indicates the American population is not immune to 
radicalization. 
Regardless if one believes al-Qa’ida is the primary threat or a more decentralized, 
leaderless structure, the simple fact is the current U.S. strategies do not adequately 
address the homegrown threat or radicalization in the homeland.  Other countries realize 
that homegrown radicalization is increasingly becoming a problem and are considering 
developing their own counterradicalization strategies.  It is time for the U.S. to do so as 
well, before it is too late. 
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III. DEFINING THE THREAT  
To this point, the discussion has focused primarily on the threat posed by al-
Qa’ida, including its affiliates and individuals inspired by the militant Islamist ideology.  
As stated in the various threat estimates, al-Qa’ida represents the greatest threat since it 
“possesses both the desire to do major damage to Western interests, and the capacity to 
turn this desire into reality” (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009, 3).  However, as 
Secretary Chertoff (2007) stressed in his testimony to the SCHSGA, it is important that 
policy makers do not limit their analysis of radicalization to just the Islamist threat, but 
understand there is a wide range of terrorist threats facing the U.S.  To fully grasp the 
terrorist threat, it is necessary to take a step back and look at the problem in its entirety so 
as not to take a myopic approach and concentrate on just one aspect.  As described in this 
chapter, the problem is much greater than the militant Islamist threat. 
A. DEFINING TERRORISM 
Start at a common reference point, it is necessary to define terrorism; 
unfortunately, attempting to agree on a universal definition is problematic.  Alex Schmid, 
an internationally renowned Dutch scholar in terrorism studies, has compiled 109 
academic definitions of terrorism (Victoroff, 2005, 4).  Obviously, this word means 
different things to different people (academics, policy makers, participants, victims, etc.).  
To some, it is al-Qa’ida; to others the definition might include the Mexican Drug Cartels.  
Then there is Yasser Arafat’s argument, that “The difference between a revolutionary and 
a terrorist lies in the reasons for which each fights” (Hoffman, 2006, 26).  This leads to 
the much-used cliché, “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.”  Based on the 
spectrum of views, it is easy to see why there is no universally accepted definition. 
Lacking such a definition, it is necessary to look at those framing U.S. homeland 
security and defense, and counterterrorism operations.  Title 6 (Domestic Security) of the 
U.S. Code, which established DHS, offers the following definition of terrorism: 
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(A) involves any act that: 
(i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of 
critical infrastructure or key resources; and 
(ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States 
or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and 
(B) appears to be intended: 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping (Definitions, 6 U.S. Code 101, 
2009, para. (16)). 
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), in the section designating the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) as the lead agency for investigating all crimes for which it 
has primary or concurrent jurisdiction, defines terrorism as: 
the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (General Functions, 
2008, para. (l)). 
Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) of the U.S. Code adds to this  definition 
by categorizing terrorism as either international or domestic, depending on origin, basing, 
and objectives of a group or individual.  DOJ and the FBI use the Title 18 definitions. 
International terrorism is defined as activities that: 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended: 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
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(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which 
they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum 
(Definitions, 18 U.S. Code 2331, para. (1)) 
Domestic terrorism is defined as activities that: 
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended: 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States (Definitions, 18 U.S. Code 2331, para. (1)) 
Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) of the U.S. Code directing DOS to 
produce an annual country report on terrorism, provides the following definition of 
terrorism:  
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents 
(Annual country reports on terrorism, 2008, para. (d)(2)). 
This section defines international terrorism as “involving citizens or the territory of more 
than 1 country” (para. (d)(1)).  The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) uses this 
definition in its 2008 Report on Terrorism. 
Meanwhile, DoD (2008) offers a slightly differing definition.  Terrorism is the: 
calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies 




It is easy to see why it is difficult to create a universally-accepted definition, when 
even the various U.S. Government departments cannot agree on a common definition.  
While these definitions are collectively intended to frame U.S. counterterrorism planning 
efforts, as Hoffman (2006) points out, they tend to mainly reflect the “priorities and 
particular interests of the specific agency.”  DHS focuses on the target (population, 
critical infrastructure, and key resources), DOJ the criminality, DOS the political nature, 
and DoD as part of asymmetric warfare (Post et al., 2009). 
From an international or extremist perspective, it could also be argued that these 
definitions are all subjective, and created by the U.S. Government, to “justify” their 
actions.  How the term “unlawful” is defined in the U.S., may differ from other countries.  
While incorporating verbiage from the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva 
Convention may help to further define what is lawful or unlawful, from an international 
perspective, even these can be interpreted differently, as not all countries are signatories 
to these agreements.  Based on the definitions provided so far, the allied fire bombings of 
cities (Dresden, Tokyo, etc.) during World War II and the use of atomic weapons against 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima could be interpreted as terrorist acts.  All were calculated 
decisions to use weapons against noncombatants in order to intimidate the governments 
and societies in pursuit of political goals.  According to the Geneva Convention and the 
Law of Armed Conflict, these would be considered unlawful acts simply based on the 
principle of proportionality.  Just as Arafat implied, how an act is characterized is largely 
based on what side of the fight you reside.  At times, how policy makers attempt to define 
a threat can actually help to validate a cause. 
Take for instance the use of the terms “war on terror” and “Jihadi.”  Defining U.S. 
efforts as a “war on terror” plays right into the narrative that this is a “war” on Islam and 
a clash of civilizations, particularly since the related strategies primarily focus on al-
Qa’ida and other Islamist groups.  The use of the terms Jihadi and Jihadists is prevalent 
throughout the literature to describe militant Islamic extremists.  In a western sense, these 
terms have taken on a negative connotation.  However, in the Muslim world, there are no 
negative connotations.  Using terms like Jihadi, or Mujahideen, to define the threat, helps 
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to validate the “holy warrior” image these groups use to justify their actions.  In a battle 
of ideas, words are the weapon of choice, and if used in the wrong context can easily cost 
you the fight. 
Based on recent remarks by John Brennan (2009), Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, it appears the current administration 
understands the importance of semantics and that “how you define the problem shapes 
how you address it.”  Phrases like “war on terrorism,” “global war,” and “jihadists” are 
no longer included in presidential speeches for the very reason that they tend to play into 
al-Qa’ida’s narrative and provide the group some legitimacy.  Another rationale for the 
changes is so the administration is not caught “floundering among the terrorist trees while 
missing the growth of the extremist forest” (Brennan, 2009, 5). 
This is where the official U.S. definitions regarding terrorism tend to fall short— 
they lack context, which in turn influences the perceived rationality of the act.  In the 
effort to solely focus on the criminality or lawfulness of a particular act, these definitions 
tend to gloss over why someone would use this tactic in the first place.  In the process, 
the various groups and individuals using terrorism start to blur into a common threat 
entity.  As a result, the policies and strategies to counter the threat take on a “one size fits 
all” perspective (e.g., a global war on terror).  The problem with such a universal 
approach is that a strategy to counter one group may not necessarily work against 
another.  For example, the tactics used against al-Qa’ida in the FATA are inappropriate 
for countering domestic terrorism.  In fact, the tactics used against al-Qa’ida overseas are 
a radicalizing factor with Islamic extremists in the U.S. (U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern 
District of New York, 2009; NEFA Foundation, 2009).  The only commonality linking 
the world’s terrorists is an extremely passionate desire for change. 
B. TERRORISM TYPOLOGY 
With so much media attention focused on Islamic (Sunni and Shia) oriented 
extremist groups (e.g., al-Qa’ida, Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyya (HAMAS), 
Hizballah), it is easy to see why there is a public perception that Islam is the source of 
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violent behavior (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2009).  However, the 
variety of groups willing to use terror as a tactic is diverse.  Based on the terrorist attacks 
conducted in 2008 attributed to a particular group, Islamic extremists only committed 
52% (NCTC, 2009, 22).  Terrorist movements can be categorized by their political (right 
and left wing, nationalists, separatists, anarchists, etc.), religious, and social orientation.  
In some cases, a group might fall within multiple categories.  For example, HAMAS and 
Hizballah both follow Islamist ideologies (Sunni and Shia, respectively), but are also 
considered nationalist movements (Palestinian and Lebanese), and political parties.  For a 
counterterrorism policy to be effective, it is necessary to understand what the group is 
trying to accomplish and why they feel threatened enough to choose to use terrorism.  
Focusing on the act alone will likely lead to a greater misunderstanding, which may result 
in an escalated use of violence in order for these groups to feel they are being “heard.” 
Another issue when discussing terrorist groups, is that not all involved in these 
groups are terrorists.  Like many organizations, there are differing levels of individual 
operational involvement.  There are the terrorists (the operators), people who facilitate 
support of the operations (e.g., logisticians and financiers), sympathizers, and then the 
communities or societies from which they come.  In focusing on the operators 
themselves, sometimes it is overlooked that supporters and sympathizers are just as 
crucial to the successful execution of an attack, especially in out-of-area operations.  
Sympathizers and supporters are also instrumental to a group’s ability to sustain day-to-
day operations.  The Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) created 
a simple model consisting of concentric circles to depict the interaction between the 
various group segments (Figure 1) (Akerboom, 2003).  The placement of each ring also 
reflects the relative proportionality of each segment in the group, with terrorists 
representing a small segment of society as a whole.  It should be kept in mind, that while 
sympathizers may only be somewhat radicalized, and most of society not at all, using 
heavy-handed tactics against any of the rings could serve as a radicalizing agent to move 
individuals toward the inner circle. 
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Figure 1.   AVID Ring Model (After Akerboom, 2003, 6). 
One last issue, and one that partly contributed to the 9/11 attacks, is U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts have traditionally been divided along the lines of international 
and domestic terrorism.  In today’s security environment, a delineation of responsibilities 
along geographic borders risks creating a self-imposed seam, which terrorist groups can 
exploit.  Given the transnational nature of these groups, they do not restrict their 
operational activities based on geographical boundaries.  With today’s technology, a cell 
or individual in the U.S. can be controlled or directed from anywhere in the world.  Just 
as important, foreign-based groups can easily serve as a virtual inspiration to those 
already residing in the U.S. 
C. INTERNATIONAL THREAT 
The 9/11 attacks brought international terrorism to the forefront of U.S. domestic 
attention and made al-Qa’ida a household name.  As a result of this event and ongoing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the average American citizen, the stereotypical 
terrorist is an Islamic fundamentalist willing to kill indiscriminately those he considers 
not to be of his faith or belief.  What many Americans do not realize is, there are many 
groups willing to use violence to further their causes, and a fair number of these groups 
threaten either the U.S. or its regional interests. 
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DOS has designated 45 groups (see Appendix for list) as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTOs) (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009b).  To be 
designated a FTO, a group’s activity must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or 
national security (national defense, foreign relations, economic interests, etc.).  A review 
of the FTO list indicates that not all are based in Southwest Asia or the Middle East, nor 
do they all have Islamist orientations.  While to some the FTOs represent the primary 
threat, in reality, these groups are responsible for a relatively small proportion of the 
attacks worldwide. 
According to the NCTC’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) 
database, in 2008, there were 11,770 acts of terrorism (NCTC, 2009a, 10).  Of these 
incidents, only 40% (NCTC, 2009a, 20) could be attributed to a specific organization 
through open source means.  Of the 150 organizations identified, DOS designated FTOs 
make up less than a third (NCTC, 2009a, 10).  These numbers reflect that the use of 
terrorism as a tactic is more widespread than among just a few groups.  The evidence also 
indicates the use of terrorism is on the rise.  WITS data shows an annual increase in the 
number of terrorist attacks since 200519 (2005–7,690, 2006–7,914, 2007–8,296, and 
2008–8,512) (NCTC, 2009a, 34).  The increase in terrorism is not all related to issues in 
the Middle East or Southwest Asia. 
Extremist groups exist in all regions.  The following is the regional breakout of 
the terrorist acts reported in 2008:  Africa–718 (2,987 deaths); East Asia and Pacific–978 
(762); Europe and Eurasia–774 (292); Near East–4594 (5,528); South Asia–4,354 
(5,826); Western Hemisphere–352 (370) (NCTC, 2009a, 19).  While most of these 
groups lack the operational capability to globally project power from foreign bases to the 
U.S. (like al-Qa’ida or Hizballah), this does not mean they lack a capacity to strike the 
U.S.  As with al-Shabaab, even the smallest of these groups are likely to have followers, 
supporters, or sympathizers living in the U.S.  In the case of Shirwa Ahmed, some of 
these individuals are quite willing to give their lives for the causes they support.  The 
threat is no longer limited to foreign-based groups. 
                                                 
19 These annual totals do not reflect terrorist attacks in Iraq, which actually dropped below 2005 levels 
(NCTC, 2009a). 
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D. DOMESTIC THREAT 
While the images of the 9/11 attacks are burnt into everyone’s mind, the fact is, 
that in 2001, domestic extremists carried out the majority of terrorist incidents in the U.S.  
1320 of the 14 recorded instances of terrorism in the U.S. and its territories in 2001, along 
with the two terrorist preventions, were attributed to domestic terrorists (FBI, 2002, 9).  
According to the WITS database (as of July 2009), since 2004, there were 24 terrorist 
attacks in the U.S. committed by domestic terrorists (NCTC, 2009b).  Despite these 
numbers, it is still hard for many to grasp domestic terrorism as a significant threat.  Yet 
prior to 9/11, the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil (168 killed) was the April 19, 
1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
by Timothy McVeigh (FBI, 2004, 41).  While McVeigh did not belong to a particular 
domestic terrorist group, his beliefs were similar to those found in many hate and right-
wing extremist groups currently operating in the U.S. today. 
Right-wing extremists21 tend to be an afterthought compared to Islamic 
extremists; however, this threat is very real.  According to the FBI, right-wing extremists 
pose a threat because of their continued weapons collecting and their inclination toward 
violence (FBI, 2004).  Additionally, white supremacists, traditionally the most violent 
right-wing group, have strengthened their recruiting and rhetoric since the 9/11 attacks.  
Since 2001, 27 disrupted plots and eight attacks were attributed to right-wing groups, or 
individuals associated with these groups (Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2009).  
The threat posed by right-wing extremists does not appear to be going away anytime 
soon. 
Two recently released (and controversial) reports, one by DHS and the other from 
the Missouri Information Analysis Center (both originally classified as For Official Use 
Only, but widely available on the Internet) addressed the potential resurgence of right-
wing extremist groups given the current political and economic climate.  Both of these 
                                                 
20 At publication, the original number was 12 as the anthrax laced letters were still under investigation. 
21 Of note, much like Islamic extremists, some of these groups place a strong emphasis on religion, as 
it provides a theological basis for racial separatism.  This particular ideology is known as Christian Identity, 
a "radicalized" theology promoting a Euro-centric version of Christianity. 
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reports received a significant backlash due to the linkage of right-wing extremists to 
conservative Republican politicians and veterans returning from the operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which, in a way, diminished the significance of these assessments.  
However, there is data to support increased recruitment and the resurgence of hate 
groups.  The SPLC reported there are currently 926 hate groups active in the U.S., as 
compared to 602 prior to September 11, 2001 (Holthouse, 2009, para. 1).  Given this 
increasing trend over the past eight years, it is not hard to imagine the election of the 
U.S.’s first minority president, combined with the Nation’s current economic problems, 
plays into the narrative fueling radicalization within these groups.  As with the 9/11 
attacks, it would be a “lack of imagination” to assume these groups will not respond with 
violence. 
Another rising concern is the threat posed by what are known as special interest 
groups (e.g., animal rights, environmental activists, and pro-life).  According to the FBI 
(2004), “Special-interest extremism incidents have increased over the last several years 
and will continue to be problematic.”  While it may seem counterintuitive to these 
groups’ agendas, as discussed later on, there are members who are quite willing to take 
human lives. 
Right-wing and special-interest groups are not the only danger; homegrown 
extremists inspired by al-Qa’ida continue to be a problem.  Since 9/11, there have been 
23 disrupted terrorist plots targeting the U.S., all inspired by militant Islamist ideology.  
In the most recent case, four individuals were arrested in May 2009 for conspiring to 
bomb a synagogue in New York City, and target an aircraft at an Air National Guard 
base.  One of the individuals claimed this was in response to Muslims being killed by 
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan (U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern 
District of New York, 2009).  The homegrown militant Islamist threat has not gone away. 
Compared to their foreign counterparts, domestic terrorist groups, or cells, tend to 
be relatively small in size and lack resources.  Despite their limited operational 
capabilities and resources, they can still mount a high profile, mass casualty attack, as 
demonstrated by the Oklahoma City bombing.  Unfortunately, such operational planning 
is often difficult to detect, since members of these groups are able to operate in the 
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mainstream and not be given a second thought.  The ability to detect domestic terrorism 
(right-wing, special-interest, or transnational inspired) will be even more complicated 
given the evolution toward the  smaller, autonomous and decentralized organizational 
structures identified by Hoffman, Sageman, and others. 
E. LEADERLESS RESISTANCE (AKA LEADERLESS JIHAD) 
Domestic extremists, such as neo-Nazi Tom Metzger and former Klansman Louis 
Beam, have championed an operational model referred to as “leaderless resistance” 
(Burton and Stewart, 2008).  This concept is based on a cell structure where cells do not 
report to a central headquarter or a single leader for direction, and operate independently 
of each other.  Lacking a centralized command and control structure, these cells must 
draw their inspiration from a larger ideological movement, which as al-Qa’ida has proven 
is very feasible.  As Beam (1992) points out, in “any movement, all persons involved 
have the same general outlook, are acquainted with the same philosophy, and generally 
react to given situations in similar ways” (para. 29).  While not the only factor, this 
underscores the importance of ideology in the radicalization process (discussed in 
Chapter IV). 
Often attributed to Beam, the originator of leaderless resistance is Colonel Ulius 
Louis Amoss, an anti-communist who developed the strategy in the early 1960s to 
counter a potential communist takeover of the U.S. (Garfinkel, 2003).  Having been 
around for some time, this concept is not limited to neo-Nazis and white supremacists. 
Besides Beam’s essay being is available in multiple languages, the use of a 
similar autonomous and decentralized organizational structure is also prevalent in 
militant Islamic literature.  This concept was endorsed (prior to his capture in 2005) by 
one of al-Qaida’s most prominent strategists, Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam 
Nasar, more commonly referred to by his pen name Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (Lia, 2007, para. 
2).  Al-Suri discussed this concept in The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, which is 
among the most frequently mentioned strategy books on extremist Web sites (Lia, 2007, 
para. 2).  Al-Suri’s writings sound very similar to Amoss and Beam in that the global 
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jihadi movement should discourage any direct contact between leadership and cells, 
leadership should be provided by “general guidance," and operative leaders should exist 
only at the cell level.  What holds this decentralized structure together is a common goal 
and doctrine along with a comprehensive self-education program. 
Despite the appearance of a disorganized structure, given the benefits of the 
Internet, these cells often possess a remarkable shared connection through online training 
manuals, audio and video recordings, and chat forums (Kohlman, 2008).  Without any 
formal contact, they can become virtual partners of al-Qa’ida (or any other group) 
through its online knowledge.  Consequentially it is also possible for non-related groups 
to learn from each other through the indirect sharing of knowledge. 
When looking at the various disrupted Islamist terrorist plots (and non-Islamist 
plots for that matter) in the U.S., it is easy to see the similarities to this leaderless 
organizational construct.  There are no personal or operational connections between the 
various plots, or back to any transnational extremist group.  Inspiration came from a 
much broader movement and its militant ideology.  Training was primarily gained from 
Internet postings and videos. 
Amoss, Beam, and al-Suri are not the only ones to see this as the best strategy for 
facing overwhelming odds.  This concept has also become the strategy for special-interest 
groups (Garfinkel, 2003).  Given the proliferation of this strategy, and the difficulty of 
tracking and monitoring such an organizational structure, the Nation’s counterterrorism 
strategy needs to consider this, as well as the prospect of implementation by individuals. 
F. LONE ACTORS (AKA LONE OFFENDERS AND LONE WOLVES) 
Central to leaderless resistance, is the responsibility of the individual to acquire 
the necessary skills and tools to accomplish the mission.  An extension of leaderless 
resistance, building on the concept of individual responsibility, is the lone actor (also 
referred to as lone offender or “lone wolf”).  The FBI assesses the most significant 
domestic terrorist threat to be the lone actor (FBI, 2004).  Much like the leaderless  
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resistance concept, these individuals draw ideological inspiration from larger, more 
formal organizations, but operate on the fringes of those movements.  McViegh is a 
textbook example. 
Al-Suri also sees the value of the lone actor—or what he refers to as the “jihad of 
individual terrorism” (Lia, 2007, para. 5).  Al-Suri actually goes as far as to say, "’the 
jihad of individual terrorism’ becomes, in reality, the only option for most jihadis” (Lia, 
2007, para. 5).  The lone actor concept has also made it onto various extremist forums.  
According to postings on one extremist Web site, “It’s a well-known fact that the perfect 
sleeper is the highly trained loner risking less chance of compromise.  It takes one 
mistake by a cell member to compromise the entire cell” (Bakier, 2008a, para. 13).  
Interestingly, this particular poster used the 2002 Washington, DC, sniper attacks as a 
case study to help argue his point. 
While leaderless resistance literature has been widely disseminated in both 
domestic and foreign extremist realms, only a few attacks are attributed to lone actors.  
Nevertheless, these attacks still manage to catch the attention of the media. 
In June 2009, a Muslim convert Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed, formerly 
known as Carlos Bledsoe, shot two soldiers standing outside a Littlerock, Arkansas, 
recruiting center.  His rationale for this attack was “he was mad at the U.S. Military 
because of what they had done to Muslims in the past” (NEFA Foundation, 2009a, 2).  
Muhammed is believed to have attended a mosque in Columbus, Ohio, frequented by 
convicted terrorists Nuradin Abdi, Iyman Faris, and Christopher Paul (Columbus Mall 
Plot) (NEFA Foundation, 2009a, 4).  Additionally, it is believed that while teaching 
English in Yemen, Muhammed may have attended the Damaj Institute, an Islamic 
institute attended by a number of radicalized U.S. converts (e.g., John Walker Lindh) 
(NEFA Foundation, 2009a, 5). 
Shortly after this attack, a white supremacist, James Von Brunn, attempted to 
attack the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC.  Von Brunn, a World War II veteran, 
had a long history with the white supremacist movements and held anti-government 
views (SPLC, 2009; Fears and Foster, 2009).  It would appear that the Holocaust 
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Museum was not the only target considered, Brunn had a list that included the White 
House, the, Capitol, and the National Cathedral (SPLC, 2009).  It is unknown why, after 
all these years, Von Brunn finally decided to take action, but it could be the DHS 
assessment regarding right-wing extremism is not that far off track. 
Preceding the Little Rock and DC attacks, a high-profile abortion doctor was 
killed in Wichita, Kansas.  The individual arrested for the crime,  Scott Roeder, was an 
anti-abortionist and had been involved with the anti-government “freemen” movement in 
the 1990s (SPLC, 2009; Carlson, 2009).  An incident like this could easily be written off 
as a criminal act or the act of a mad man, but the significance may lie in the inspiration it 
provides to others to act.  Since this attack preceded the Little Rock and Holocaust 
Museum attacks, is it possible that Roeder inspired the other attackers to act on their 
beliefs?  Is it possible that inspiration can cross ideological lines? 
In addition to the operational security aspect, the element of surprise in these three 
examples is what makes the lone actor an effective weapon.  The concern is since these 
individuals operate on the fringes of the movements they support, the ability to detect and 
prevent these events from happening is problematic at best.  As the previous incidents 
show, lone actors are not limited to any one group or movement. 
There is one last point concerning the lone actor threat.  In the past, these 
individuals would have been considered anti-social.  However, even the Internet has 
contributed to the evolution of this threat.  Based on research by Sageman (2008a), the 
Internet allows “loners” to participate in chat rooms to discuss plans and receive 
encouragement to carry out the attacks.  An interesting example is the case of the youth 
involved in the Red Lake, Minnesota, school shootings.  Although a Native American, he 
was an active member of a neo-Nazi forum, which apparently served as a source of 
inspiration and encouragement (Sageman).  The Internet allows individual extremists to 
interact with groups in ways that would be inconceivable face-to-face.  Even if 
radicalized individuals, or groups of individuals, do not actively communicate with 
otherlike-minded individuals in the U.S. or around the world, the Internet can provide an 
invaluable “handbook” for lone actors, such as the on-line posting of the ten-step manual 
entitled “Lone Wolves of Al-Qaeda” (Leiter, 2008). 
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G. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
The first issue in regards to the Nation’s counterterrorism strategy is that it 
focuses on the tactic being used.  As reflected in all the related U.S. department 
definitions, it all boils down to the legality of the act.  The freedom fighter versus terrorist 
debate helps to illustrate how such a view can undermine a country’s policies.  Take for 
example, HAMAS and Hizballah, both DOS designated FTOs, which have managed to 
win seats in parliamentary elections.  Despite the ongoing evolution of these groups from 
primarily terrorist organizations to political parties, they are still treated as terrorists from 
a U.S. foreign policy perspective.  As such, what is the incentive for the groups to 
participate in their respective governments if the rules continue to change after they win?  
From a contextual perspective, U.S. policy cannot “see the forest for the trees.” 
The threat to homeland security is diverse.  There are both foreign and domestic 
aspects to the threat that will continue to exist for some time.  The organizational 
structure of these groups is changing and concepts, such as leaderless resistance or lone 
actors, are becoming more prevalent on the web.  These trends reflect the evolution of 
terrorism as traditionally characterized.  The importance of formal organizations seems to 
be increasingly overshadowed by the ideology inspiring individuals to conduct terrorist 
acts.  Given the success of military operations abroad and law enforcement measures at 
home, al-Suri may be correct that individual terrorism is the only option.  A more 
diversified and individual based threat is harder to detect and may require a different 
strategy to prevent than using just law enforcement measures. 
Joshua Ramo (2009), in The Age of the Unthinkable, claims, “The power of the 
individual has never been greater.”  The devolution of the large terrorist organizations to 
a leaderless structure and the power of individuals (McVeigh and the DC snipers) to 
generate wide-scale fear reflects the truth of this statement.  However, instead of looking 
at the negative connotations of this statement, should not the Nation’s strategy for 
countering terrorism focus on tapping into this strength? 
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To determine if such a strategy is feasible, it is necessary to see if there are certain 
contributing factors leading individuals down a pathway toward conducting terrorist acts.  
By identifying these commonalities, it is possible the process can be disrupted before a 
person becomes radicalized to the point where they feel terrorism is their only option.  
The next chapter looks at how individuals become radicalized to determine what can be 
done to derail this process. 
 53
IV. RADICALIZATION 
Testifying before the SCHSGA, Secretary Chertoff (2007) stated, once “we 
understand the process that leads a person to support and/or pursue violence, we will be 
in the best position to protect our country from the widest possible range of threats” (1).  
Achieving a better understanding of this process is the key to countering the problem.  As 
Brennan noted, how the problem is defined, shapes the response.  However, clear-cut 
answers regarding this topic are fleeting, as there appears to be no single underlying 
catalyst for radicalization. 
A. PSYCHOSOCIAL FACTORS 
The literature review showed there was a broad range of sociological, 
psychological, and psychiatric theories.  For the most part, the various theories fall into 
two categories:  dispositional and situational.  The dispositional perspective implies there 
are internal determinates for anti-social behavior and that certain individuals are 
predisposed to carry out acts of violence.  The situationist perspective argues that the 
situation exerts the greater power over individual actions. 
A similar means of categorizing the various theories, is offered by the 
“syndrome” and “tool” perspectives.  As with the dispositional approach, the syndrome 
perspective focuses on pathological traits and suggests terrorism is “a kind of ‘disease’ 
with a definite etiology, developmental trajectory, and consequences” (Kruglanski and 
Fishman, 2006, 194).  On the other hand, the “tools perspective views terrorism as a 
means to an end, a tactic of warfare that anyone could use” (Kruglanski and Fishman, 
2006, 194).  Much like the situationist perspective, this perspective focuses on the 
conditions under which an individual or group decides on a particular course of action. 
The research did not find any evidence to support the belief that personality traits 
can be used as a predictor for understanding why people become terrorists.  Thus, the 
dispositional and syndrome perspectives offer limited utility in this discussion.  However, 
while the situational and tool perspectives offer a better explanation, there is still one 
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important unanswered question, why are some people more susceptible to a given 
situation?  Not all people exposed to a particular situation respond the same.  For 
example, the psychological affect of violence among Israelis and Palestinians.  Both 
populations live in a conflict zone and are exposed to varying degrees and periodicity of 
violence.  Admittedly, the Palestinians have suffered a greater proportion of causalities 
and destruction of property.  As can be expected, this has taken a greater psychological 
toll on the Palestinians.  Whereas the majority of the Israelis feel optimistic about their 
future and there appears to be a feeling of universal resilience (possibly reinforced by the 
experience of the Holocaust), the Palestinian population suffers from a higher percentage 
of emotional and behavioral disorders and does not appear to possess a similar optimistic 
outlook (Brandon and Silke, 2007).  Yet despite the greater proportion of emotional and 
behavioral disorders, not all Palestinians exposed to violence become terrorists. 
This last point tends to undermine approaches based on identifying “root causes.”  
While many people share similar traumatic backgrounds and experiences, proportionally 
few become terrorists (Precht, 2007).  Instead of focusing on why a person becomes a 
terrorist, a more practical option is looking at how a person becomes radicalized. 
B. RADICALIZATION PROCESS 
Based on the literature review, there is not a common terrorist mindset within 
groups or among individuals.  Therefore, there is no useful profile to assist law 
enforcement or intelligence in determining who is vulnerable to radicalization.  While 
there is no psychological profile to determine who might become a terrorist, there does 
appear to be a common radicalization pathway, or pattern.  Based on a study of disrupted 
western homegrown plots22, the New York Police Department (NYPD) Intelligence 
Division developed a four-stage model (Silber and Bhatt, 2007) (Figure 2) to depict the 
radicalization process. 
                                                 
22 Madrid attack (March 2004), Amsterdam’s Hofstad Group, London attack (July 2005), Australia’s 
Operation Pendennis, Canada’s Toronto 18 Case, The Lackawana Six (New York), The Portland Seven 
(Oregon), Virginia Jihad Network, and the 2004 Herald Square Subway Plot (New York City). 
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Figure 2.   NYPD Model (After Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 19). 
 Pre-radicalization: The period before an individual is exposed to an 
incident or episode making them receptive to an extremist ideology. 
 Self-identification: Influenced by either internal or external factors, an 
individual begins to change their worldview and associate with like-
minded individuals. 
 Indoctrination: The individual fully adopts an ideology and becomes 
willing to take action to further the cause. 
 “Jihadization”: Individual decides to take action and participates in the 
planning, preparation and execution of an act. 
All of the individuals analyzed by Silber and Bhatt (2007) followed this 
sequential process.  However, it should be noted that it is not guaranteed every individual 
entering this process will follow through to the end.  Another key point is there is not a 
timeline associated with this process.  The first three phases could take place over a two 
to three year period.  However, the “jihadization” component can be a very rapid process, 
taking only a few months, or weeks to run its course. 
A report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice looking at homegrown 
radicalization in Europe validated the research in the NYPD study.  Precht (2007) uses 
the same model, but offers slightly differing labels for the phases (Pre-radicalization, 
Conversion and Identification, Conviction and Indoctrination, and Action) that provide a 
more generic context that can be used for non-Islamist groups (Table 1).  One notable 
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difference is the timetable associated with the radicalization process.  According to 
Precht’s analysis, radicalization can happen over several years or a few months, and 
seems to be occurring quicker than just a few years ago. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 






• Identity crisis 
• Experience of 
discrimination, 
alienation, or other 
perceived injustices 
• Living environment, 
neighborhood, and 
family 
• Personal trauma 





• Religious facilities 
• Internet 
• School 
• Youth clubs 
• Work 
• Prison 
• Family and friends  
Conversion 
 From no faith to 
religious identity 
 More radical 
interpretation of 
faith 
 Shift from one faith 











• Activism, “wanting 
a cause” 





• Same as Phase 1  
Conviction 
• Isolation from 
former life 
• Increased training 
• Assignment of roles  
• Ready for action 
 
Catalyst  
• Overseas travel 
(religious or camp 
training) 
• Group bonding 
• Local training camp  
 
Meeting places 
• Private homes 








• Overseas travel 
• Group bonding 





• Target selection 
• Surveillance 
• Fabrication of bomb or 
other means of terror 
• Test run 
 
Meeting places 
• Same as Phase 3  
Table 1.   A Model of the Radicalization Process - From Conversion to Terrorism (After 
Precht, 2007, 34). 
Similar to the NYPD model and Precht’s adaptation, Fathali Moghaddam (2006) 
uses a staircase analogy to conceptualize the decision process a person uses in becoming 
a terrorist.  The stairway represents a narrowing passageway suggesting that as 
individuals progress they see fewer options, until the final culminating point: 
 Ground Floor: Equivalent to the pre-radicalization stage of the previous 
two models.  What matters most is an individual’s feelings of deprivation, 
and perceptions of fairness and justice, all of which contribute to the 
formation of their “identity” (how they value themselves). 
 57
 First Floor: Equivalent to the conversion part of Precht’s second phase.  A 
person moves to this level in hopes of improving their living conditions, 
finding justice, and achieving a satisfactory identity. 
 Second Floor: Equivalent to the identification phase of both models.  
Unable to rectify their grievances, individuals become more receptive to 
messages identifying the causes of their problems.  A key aspect of this 
level involves the displacement of aggression, which creates an “us” 
versus “them” mentality. 
 Third Floor: Equivalent to both the identification and conviction stages of 
Precht’s model.  This level involves the development of a belief structure 
that the individual is involved in a struggle to achieve the ideal society by 
any means possible.  This process not only provides them a “meaningful” 
identity, but also helps to build a morality supportive of the use of 
violence to further the cause. 
 Fourth Floor: Equivalent to the indoctrination stage of both models.  
Psychologically, the individual fully assumes the “terrorist” identity and is 
socialized into the terrorist organization. 
 Fifth Floor: Equivalent to the “jihadization” and action phases.  A person 
is ready to commit a terrorist act. 
The models discussed show what appears to be a common pathway toward 
radicalization.  However, there is not just one route to this process, rather there are 
individual routes.  There is no guarantee that individuals who begin the radicalization 
process will pass through all stages (or move to the next floor).  The radicalization 
process seems largely influenced by the environment in which people live, with the 
primary difference being on whether they are within or outside a conflict zone. 
Within a conflict zone, motivations can consist of nationalism, community 
defense, trauma, and revenge.  In many ways, these individuals have a mentality similar 
to insurgents (Speckhard, 2008). 
In non-conflict zones, the motivational factors are entirely different, emanating 
out of issues, such as immigration, migration, a “clash of cultures,” and personal desires: 
 A sense of societal alienation and marginalization for those transplanted 
out of their original cultures; 
 A loss of positive self concept or lack of positive identity, 
 A desire for a meaningful life; 
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 A desire to belong to a group provides one a positive identity and a 
mission; 
 A desire for adventure and heroism; 
 Secondary traumatization occurring within conflict zones (e.g., identifying 
with traumas and injustices committed in Chechnya and Palestine, 
although individual lives elsewhere); 
 A desire for personal redemption from some vice or inner corruption; and 
 A desire to be seen as attractive and worthy to the opposite sex 
(Speckhard, 2008). 
In regards to domestic extremism, a theme across the various models and 
motivational factors is individuals seeking a positive identity (individual or collective) 
and a just cause.  Based on this evidence, “group, organization and social psychology, 
with a particular emphasis on ‘collective identity,’ provides the most constructive 
framework for understanding terrorist psychology and behavior” (Post, 2007, 4).  This 
was also the finding at the March 2005 International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, 
and Security, where the Committee on the Psychological Roots of Terrorism emphasized 
the need to understand the “socio-cultural context, which determines the balance between 
collective and individual identity” (Post et al., 2009, 19). 
C. IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY 
When discussing radicalization, probably one of the most crucial aspects is 
identity, both personal and collective.  Personal identity is particularly a problem 
observed among first to third generation immigrants, who feel they no longer fit back 
home, but as a minority may feel they are not welcomed in their new country (Speckhard, 
2008).  However, the lack of identity can take on a far broader perspective.  For example, 
it has been argued many Muslims suffer from a collective identity crisis (Moghaddam, 
2008b).  This identity crisis is fueled by the fact that 60% of the global Muslim 
population is below the age of 25 (Moghaddam, 2008b, 4) and are desperately trying to 
improve their identity, but are for the most part limited to two competing options. 
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The first involves mirroring the western model, which leads to what Moghaddam 
(2008b) characterizes as the “good copy problem.”  By copying the West, Muslims can 
only hope to become good copies of borrowed Western ideals, which does not allow 
them to achieve the authentic identity they desire. 
In this case, an alternative to the western model is for Muslim youths to develop 
an identity based on Islamic fundamentalism.  The image of a heroic, holy warrior 
(mujahedeen) resonates among young Muslim men who are most vulnerable to visions of 
honor, bravery and sacrifice for what is perceived as a noble cause—the Jihad 
(Speckhard, 2009). 
In the traditional sense, jihad is defined as a spiritual struggle to purify Islam and 
a physical struggle to defend Islam against its enemies. The destruction of the once great 
Muslim Caliphate can be attributed to either imperfections in Islamic practice or to 
foreign “non-Islamic” corruption of Islamic society. It is from this distorted view of 
history and religion that al-Qa’ida’s ideology descends.  In the case of the Muslim 
youths, the militant Islamist ideology provides not only a source of blame for their 
position in life, but more importantly an opportunity for redemption. 
D. IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND THE NARRATIVE 
Figure 2 illustrates how ideology plays a key role in radicalization, as it provides 
a central guiding force throughout the entire process to assist those moving through the 
various stages (or to the next floor).  Ideology also helps to structure individual thoughts 
during their conversion.  However, as discussed in Chapter II, individuals rarely commit 
acts of violence for purely ideological reasons and an ideology does not influence 
behavior in a vacuum.  Personal frustrations, perceived injustices, and a multitude of 
other grievances can prompt individuals to reassess their current situation and be more 




A compelling ideology and a supporting narrative are crucial, as these help to 
frame the actions of a group, or individual.  Both are also important in maintaining an 
individual’s commitment to extremist activities and group cohesion.  For example, the 
militant Islamist ideology espoused by al-Qa’ida offers a universally applicable and 
easily implemented solution to all problems.  Al-Qa’ida’s core narrative is that the West 
and its allies seek to destroy Islam, Muslims must fight against this threat, and just rule 
under Islamic law is the reward for expelling Western influence (Leiter, 2008).  This 
simple narrative identities the source of the problem, provides a noble identity, a just 
cause, justifies the use of violence, and offers a reward in just a few lines of text. 
It is easy to see how such a message is attractive to those suffering from a 
collective identity crisis, particularly if they feel the alternative is to be a good copy of 
those they perceive are trying to oppress them. 
E. DISTANCE-TRAVELED HYPOTHESIS 
There is an argument that the “pull” of the narrative is stronger the closer you are 
to the source of the problem.  Moghaddam’s (2008) “distance-traveled hypothesis” states 
the distance an individual has to travel in order to settle in a host country determines the 
resources needed to succeed.  Since immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, and 
Southwest Asia require greater resources to settle in the U.S. then they would need to 
settle in Europe, they are more likely to succeed in the U.S., particularly in terms of 
economic and educational attainment.  Thus, in theory, the militant Islamist message may 
not be as attractive to those living in the U.S. as compared to the UK because they are 
inherently better off.  However, attempting to draw a correlation between socioeconomic 
status and extremism can actually lead policy makers astray. 
Research shows that a significant percentage of the Islamist extremists came from 
middle- or upper-class backgrounds.  Sageman’s (2204) study of 102 Islamic extremists 
found only 27% were considered lower class compared to 18% upper class and  55% 
middle class, which corresponds to the data that roughly a quarter came from unskilled 
backgrounds (43% professional, 33% semiskilled).  Another study, based only on 
European Islamic extremist networks, found a greater proportion came from the lower 
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class (54%,) compared to 4% upper class and 42% middle class (Bakker, 2006, 38).  
Other research found, that “at the time of joining, the majority of Islamists had 
professional occupations (e.g., physicians, teachers) or semiskilled employment (e.g., 
police, civil service, students), less than a quarter were unemployed or working in 
unskilled jobs” (Silke, 2008, 107).  This data tends to weaken an argument drawing a 
connection between socioeconomic status and extremism, which is often used to 
rationalize a lack of radicalization in the U.S. 
Numerous reports state that Muslim Americans are, for the most part, well 
integrated in American society, and they achieve statistically higher levels of economic 
and educational achievement than most other minority groups within the U.S. (Mudd, 
2009).  For this reason, there is a perception that the U.S. does not have to worry about 
the same problems that the UK faces.  However, recent data shows that immigrants may 
not be faring as well in light of the current economic crisis.  The number of unemployed 
immigrants has increased 130% since 2007 compared to 81% for native Americans 
(Camorata and Jensenius, 2009, 14).  Such a wide difference indicates some of the 
assumptions concerning the integration of immigrants may no longer hold true, especially 
considering some of the hardest hit by unemployment include the most educated 
immigrants (Camorata and Jensenius, 2009). 
Unemployment statistics aside, there are certainly cracks in how minorities view 
themselves in American society.  External influences are increasingly playing a greater 
role, as indicated by the reaction to military operations in the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia, as well as U.S. foreign policy related to Somalia.  While not as numerous as the 
disrupted right-wing plots since 2001, there have nonetheless been multiple plots inspired 
by al-Qa’ida and its militant Islamist ideology.  Similarly to the events leading up to 9/11, 
it is a “failure of imagination” to think that radicalization does not happen in the U.S. 
The fact that the Somali community is starting to show some of the same fractures 
(issues with foreign policy, combined with domestic social, cultural, and economic 
sources of discontent) as the Southwest Asian communities in the UK (O’Duffy, 2008; 
Mudd, 2009), indicates the need for engagement with various immigrant communities to 
prevent this issue from growing into a more direct threat to the Homeland.  Shirwa 
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Ahmed was not the only Somali to become radicalized to the point of traveling to 
Somalia to fight for al-Shabaab.  Since late 2006, the FBI has seen several individuals 
from the U.S., some with ethnic ties and some without, travel to Somalia to train or fight 
(Mudd, 2009).  The number of individuals observed is comparatively larger than the 
number of individuals who have left the U.S. for other conflicts.  Instead of looking at 
this as an abnormality, it is possible that this is another indicator of the increasing 
radicalization in the U.S. 
Another issue with the distance-traveled hypothesis is it is based on the 
assumption that all immigrants come to the U.S. by their own means (resource wise).  
However, the majority of the Somalis in the U.S. are part of a resettlement program 
(Mudd, 2009); therefore, the resource part of the equation is not the same.  Could similar 
problems be experienced with individuals being resettled due to the conflicts elsewhere?  
Alternatively, given the current economic crisis, other ethnic groups or right-wing 
extremists could become motivated to protect their interests.  As discussed in Chapter III, 
there is a diverse range of extremist threats, some which are indigenous. 
F. RADICAL INFLUENCES IN THE U.S. 
Compared to Muslims around the world, extremism among Muslim Americans is 
statistically lower; however, there is still some acceptance of radical views.  Al-Qa’ida 
realizes the potential extremism and has attempted to improve its ability to translate the 
messages into English.  Al-Qa'ida is soliciting translators and several radical Web sites in 
the U.S. have re-packaged al-Qa'ida statements with American vernacular and 
commentary intending to sway Muslim Americans (Allen, 2008). 
Besides al-Qa’ida, another Islamist influence in the U.S. is the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  As there are many figures in the Muslim American communities who are 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and many mosques are controlled by their 
associates, it is considered one of the most influential factors (Haqqani, 2008).  While the 




past practices in the Middle East, the group’s ideology remains opposed to Western 
democracies.  One of the group’s stated objectives in the U.S. is a Jihad to destroy the 
country from within (Farah, Sandee, and Lefkowitz, 2007). 
The Muslim Brotherhood is not without competition in the U.S. (or the rest of the 
world for that matter).  Another Islamist organization gaining momentum in the U.S. is 
Hizb ut-Tahrir.23  The goal of Hizb ut-Tahrir is to unite the global Muslim community by 
overthrowing secular governments and replacing them with a Caliph who would 
implement Sharia law.  Previously hampered by its ability to compete with other Islamist 
groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir has started to make inroads in 
the U.S. (Gruen, 2009).  In accordance with their global strategy, Hizb ut-Tahrir seeks to 
recruit well-educated professionals (doctors, lawyers, business owners, scientists, 
engineers and professors) who are influential in their communities.  Even though Hizb ut-
Tahrir claims it is a non-violent organization, there are several cases of individuals 
moving on from this group to more militant organizations (Gruen, 2009).  Ed Husain, in 
his book The Islamist (2007) offers a detailed account of the process and tactics used by 
Hizb ut-Tahrir to infiltrate British society. 
Just like the splintering of regional terrorist groups, similar fissures exist among 
the various Islamist groups.  Differences within the Muslim Brotherhood led to the 
formation of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and differences within this group led to the formation of an 
even more radical group, al-Muhajiroun.24 
Thus, there are multiple Islamist options in the U.S. for individuals to participate.  
The “non-violent” Muslim Brotherhood, or Hizb ut-Tahrir, which does not openly 
advocate for violence but seeks a caliphate under Sharia law, or al-Muhajiroun, which 
offers another level of extremism short of the terrorist option.  However, while these 
groups do not openly participate in terrorist acts, they can serve as a “conveyor belt” to 
get someone to the point where they want to act. 
                                                 
23 Founded by Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani in 1953 after splinting from the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Bergin and Townsend, 2006). 
24 Founded by Omar Bakri Mohammed in 1996 after splitting from Hizb ut-Tahrir (Baran, 2008). 
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Although Muslim Americans seem to be well integrated in society, the message 
of Muslim unity from al-Qa’ida, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir, or al-
Muhajiroun, may be attractive to those pre-disposed to support the militant Islamist 
movement based on the perception that this is a noble cause.  In this case, the noble cause 
links back to the narrative that characterizes all crises involving Muslims as conflicts 
between believers and non-believers.  As such, it is every Muslim’s duty to counter this 
threat. 
However, militant Islam is not the only source of radicalization in the U.S.  A 
more ingrained presence is offered by the multitude of right-wing organizations in the 
U.S.  As detailed in the previous chapter, in recent months, individuals with anti-
government, racist, anti-Semitic or pro-militia views have committed a series of high-
profile attacks.  There is also a concern that “militiamen, white supremacists, anti-
Semites, nativists, tax protesters and a range of other activists of the radical right are 
cross-pollinating and may even be coalescing” (SPLC, 2009, 6).  If these groups could 
somehow manage to overcome their differences to form a broader right-wing movement, 
the U.S. Government could find itself facing an even greater domestic terrorist threat. 
G. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
There is no clear psychological answer to why a person becomes a terrorist.  
Niether does it seem individuals are predisposed to become terrorists.  Thus, it is 
impossible to create a clear-cut terrorist profile.  Rather, the research tends to support the 
theory that situational factors are more influential in the radicalization process. 
Some key elements that can play into the radicalization process are the influence 
of a charismatic leader, the Internet, a sense of alienation, perception of marginalization, 
political oppression, discrimination, poverty, perceived wrong doings of foreign policy, 
and a desire to accomplish something important.  Yet, this does not explain why all 
individuals exposed to similar traumatic situations and experiences are not prone to 




path of terrorism (Precht, 2007).  Rather, radicalization is a product of a combination of 
motivational factors (Figure 3).  Instead of focusing on why a person becomes a terrorist, 
a more practical option is to look at how a person becomes radicalized. 
 
Figure 3.   Motivational Factors for Entering the Radicalization Process (After Precht, 
2007, 38). 
The models discussed help illustrate how an individual becomes radicalized.  The 
early stages of these models offer the best opportunity to dissuade an individual from 
becoming a terrorist.  Thus, the logical conclusion is that preventing an individual from 
becoming a terrorist requires a strategy focused on disrupting the pre-radicalization and 
the conversion/identification phases.  It should be noted that these are the same phases on 
which the radicalizing influences in the U.S. are focused.  To win the battle of ideas, U.S. 
strategy needs to be focused on the same “battlefield” as the adversary. 
Some may continue to down-play the level of radicalization; however, the 
presence of Islamic and right-wing extremists in the U.S. shows that radicalization exists.  
Some of the assumptions and theories used in the past to counter the radicalization 
argument may no longer be valid, as in the case of distance traveled and socioeconomic 
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factors.  Polling data and the disruption of domestic terrorist plots indicates the American 
population is not as immune to radicalization as it once was considered to be.  The 
current economic crisis could further influence radicalization, particularly if a population 
segment perceives that they are being singled out. 
Given these trends, there is a need to prevent the levels of radicalization from 
increasing and turning into a more direct threat to the Nation’s security.  The next chapter 
will look at how effectively the existing U.S. strategies address this problem. 
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V. U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH FOR COUNTERING 
RADICALIZATION 
The implied task of the 9/11 Commission was the creation of a counterterrorism 
strategy, focusing on taking the fight to terrorist networks and preventing them from 
increasing their ranks or replacing losses.  The U.S. has taken the fight to these networks, 
with some success in targeting key personnel.  However, in preventing the replacement of 
losses, U.S. strategy has not been effective, as radicalization continues to appear from 
Minneapolis to Melbourne, Australia, and points in between.  It can be argued that the 
success of military operations abroad has indirectly led to this increase in homegrown 
extremism.  Individuals desiring to participate in the overseas conflicts are finding it 
increasingly difficult to accomplish this goal.  Not wanting to let their “brothers” down, 
some have decided to act in place. 
The lesson here is that no direct correlation between attacking a network and 
countering radicalization can be identified.  Physically attacking the network does not 
necessarily diminish radicalization.  However, countering radicalization can directly 
affect the flow of recruits to a network.  Unfortunately, for those already radicalized, 
counterradicalization tools will have minimal impact on those individuals who have 
already reached the tipping point.  Thus, a balanced strategy needs to address both the 
organization and the radicalization process to effectively negate the threat. 
As indentified in the literature review, there are ten national strategies related to 
homeland defense and security, and countering terrorism.  Most touch on attacking or 
countering terrorist networks.  None focus solely on countering radicalization.  Only the 
NSCT and NSHS address radicalization, albeit minimally. 
A. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) starts by explaining the 
U.S. is at war with a “transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and 
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individuals…fueled by a radical ideology” (White House, 2006, 5).25  It characterizes this 
war of consisting of both a “battle of arms and a battle of ideas” (White House, 2006, 1). 
To win the “war on terror,” the NSCT’s objectives are: 
 Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; 
 Deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction;  
 Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; 
 Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use to launch operations; 
 Advance effective democracies as the long-term solution to the ideology 
of terrorism; and 
 Build the institutions and structures needed to carry the fight forward 
against terror and help ensure success (White House, 2006, 1). 
While the strategy states the importance of ideology and winning the battle of 
ideas, what is noticeably lacking in the above list of objectives is one specifically focused 
on countering radicalization or the ideology.  In fact, nowhere does it address how to 
actually counter the radicalization process, domestically or internationally. 
The NSCT implies the war on terror will be won by “the advancement of freedom 
and human dignity through effective democracy” (White House, 2006, 9).  While the 
NSCT does not specifically mention a particular form of democracy (i.e., Western), the 
use of this term can be expected to be met with some level of suspicion in the Middle 
East and elsewhere, based on past U.S. actions.  First, it serves as a contradiction in light 
of U.S. foreign policy decisions to support authoritarian regimes and monarchies in the 
Muslim world.  Then, there is the failure to recognize the 2006 Hamas electoral victory, 
which was interpreted by Muslims around the world as the U.S. and Europe's 
unwillingness to accept any electoral decision in the Muslim world, when it differs from 
their preference (Berger, 2007).  From a Muslim perspective, the U.S. Government’s 
attempts to link democratization to countering radicalization lacks sincerity, and this 
 
 
                                                 
25 It also states there are other groups and individuals that use terror as a means of accomplishing their 
political objectives; however, no other groups or ideologies are discussed. 
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credibility issue is actually “the West’s main enemy” (Berger, 2007, 6).  Besides, as 
proven in the U.S., democracy is not the solution to everyone’s problems or else domestic 
terrorism would not be an issue. 
While the strategy offers democracy as the solution, it acknowledges the fact that 
“democracies are not immune to terrorism” (White House, 2006, 10), including the U.S.  
While the strategy addresses the need to guard against the emergence of homegrown 
terrorists, it frames the solution around engaging with the Muslim community to reject 
violent extremism.  As shown in the previous chapters, there are non-Islamic sources of 
radicalization in the U.S. this strategy glosses over.  Regardless, the NSCT does not offer 
any specific guidance on how to counter the ideology fueling the radicalization process. 
B. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (NSHS) 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the NSHS is not limited to traditional security 
measures.  In addition to terrorism, the strategy also addresses a range of catastrophic 
events, manmade and natural.  To “secure” the U.S., the NSHS focuses on four priorities: 
 Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; 
 Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources; 
 Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and 
 Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success 
(Homeland Security Council, 2007, 1). 
Like the NSCT, the emphasis of the NSHS is on dealing with al-Qa’ida.  The 
NSHS acknowledges the fact that other groups and individuals pose a threat to the U.S., 
but Hizballah is the only other FTO discussed.  The NSHS points out that the terrorist 
threat to the U.S. is not limited to violent Islamic extremist groups, but includes single-
issue groups (e.g., animal rights extremists and environmentalists) and right-wing 
extremists. 
Like the NSCT, advancing an effective democracy is seen as the long-term 
solution for countering the militant ideology, hampering recruitment, and defeating 
homegrown extremism.  However, the NSHS actually addresses the need to prevent 
radicalization in the U.S.  In this section of the strategy, there are four objectives:  
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 Identify and counter the sources of radicalization;  
 Continue to advance our understanding of radicalization; 
 Engage communities as partners in the War on Terror; and 
 Enhance Federal, State, local, and Tribal government capacities to address 
radicalization (Homeland Security Council, 2007, 22–23). 
Despite the broader definition of the terrorist threat, the NSHS still focuses 
primarily on the Islamist threat and Muslim communities.  That said, the strategy does hit 
on some key points, such as promoting the values of citizenship, integration, religious 
tolerance, freedom of speech, and the protection of civil rights.  However, like the NSCT, 
the NSHS does not go into any detail how to accomplish these objectives. 
C. VIEWS ON IMPROVING U.S. COUNTERRADICALIZATION EFFORTS 
Prior to the 2008 presidential election, several articles and publications were 
released offering the new administration advice on how to counter radicalization.  Most 
of the recommendations offered are a continuation of themes already addressed in the 
NSCT and NSHS.  Countering radicalization still seems to primarily focus on public 
diplomacy and strategic communications directed at populations abroad. 
One of the articles from last year, offered the following ten recommendations for 
countering radicalization: 
 Exerting presidential leadership in civil liberties and reducing anti-Muslim 
bigotry; 
 Creating an America’s Voice Corps; 
 Establishing American Centers across the region; 
 Implementing an American Knowledge Library initiate; 
 Privatizing al Hurra ad Radio Sawa26; 
 Launching “C-SPANs”  for the Muslim World; 
 Bolstering cultural exchange programs while improving the visa process; 
 Harnessing America’s diversity by engaging Arab and Muslim Americans; 
 Involving the whole federal bureaucracy in public diplomacy; and 
                                                 
26 U.S. Government organized satellite TV and radio stations broadcasting in Arabic. 
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 Empowering private citizens and local legislators to build their own 
productive international linkages (Amr and Singer, 2008, 217–219). 
Only the recommendation dealing with civil liberties and bigotry had a homeland focus, 
but not really in the sense of countering domestic extremism.  Rather, this is aimed at 
showing the rest of the world the U.S. lives “up to our civil liberties ideals” (Amr and 
Singer, 2008, 217). 
Nevertheless, there are elements of the recommendations that should be 
considered for implementing domestically.  An example of this would be “Harnessing of 
America’s diversity” to help with engagement of the different ethnic communities.  
Individuals of ethnic descent would be far better messengers than law enforcement 
personnel in certain communities.  Then there is involving the “whole federal 
bureaucracy in public diplomacy.”  Countering domestic radicalization is by no means a 
law enforcement issue.  Nor, is it solely a federal government issue.  Other agencies at 
the state and local levels could be used to help expand relationships into communities 
facing radicalization issues. 
Another article argued a new counterradicalization strategy should be part of a 
broader U.S. foreign assistance strategy.  Recommendations focused on two areas:  
support for good governance and anticorruption programs, and improvements in social 
service provisions (Von Hippel, 2008).  Domestic radicalization was not addressed. 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy also published a report providing a 
rather detailed strategy for countering radicalization.  The report offers the Obama 
administration several recommendations (categorized as strategic, functional, and 
organizational), intended to change the course of the Bush administration’s approach. 
Strategic recommendations from the (Presidential Task Force on Confronting the 
Ideology of Radical Extremist [Presidential Task Force], 2009, 13) are: 
 Expand focus from violent to nonviolent extremism; 
 Empower mainstream Muslim voices; and 
 Address local grievances, not only global ones. 
Functional recommendations (Presidential Task Force, 2009, 13–18) are: 
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 Rejuvenate efforts to promote prosperity, reform, and democracy in Arab 
countries; 
 Reorient public diplomacy to support our allies efforts; 
 Go beyond the American brand; 
 Employ nuanced, non-combative rhetoric; 
 Challenge extremists in cyberspace; 
 Coordinate counterradicalization programs; and 
 Improve domestic counterradicalization efforts. 
Structural recommendations (Presidential Task Force, 2009, 18–20) are: 
 Fix the existing bureaucracy; 
 Designate a single address for the coordination of U.S. public diplomacy, 
strategic, strategic communications, and counterradicalization strategy; 
 Strengthen the role and capacity of the State Department; and 
 Reorient the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) for strategic 
communications. 
Of the various articles and reports published, the Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy’s report offered the most comprehensive solution.  However, of the 15 
recommendations, only one is truly domestically focused (Improve domestic 
counterradicalization efforts). 
In regards to countering domestic radicalization, the Presidential Task Force 
(2009) provided four supporting recommendations (17–18): 
 Utilize best practices from abroad; 
 Broaden Muslim outreach; 
 Diversity is essential; and 
 Highlight U.S. actions domestically. 
The Presidential Task Force’s domestic radicalization recommendation does not 
address any aspect other than Islamic extremism.  Nonetheless, there are aspects that 
could be incorporated into a broader strategy.  One of the conclusions is that government 
should “work with communities to develop alternative non–law enforcement mechanisms 
at the local level, both governmental and nongovernmental, to deal with radicalization in 
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these communities” (Presidential Task Force, 2009, 18).  Another was highlighting U.S. 
counterradicalization efforts domestically, as this would help communities to understand 
the various mechanisms available to them for resolving their grievances. 
D. CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL LIBERTY CONSIDERATIONS 
In deciding to implement a domestic counterradicalization strategy, the first item 
needing to be taken into consideration is the impact on the constitutional rights and civil 
liberties offered to U.S. citizens. 
The most commonly discussed issues related to countering politically or 
religiously oriented messages in a homeland setting is the First Amendment.  As stated in 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
There are numerous extremist Web sites, but short of making a terrorist threat, what is the 
legal threshold to determine if these sites have gone beyond what could be considered 
“free speech”? 
Another potential constitutional rights issue that frequently comes up is related to 
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Measures to monitor extremist use of the Internet could entail the unwarranted 
capture and retention of private communications data from ordinary citizens.  Once again, 
what is the legal threshold of maintaining extremist literature if no intent of a terrorist act 
has been determined? 
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The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
As in the case of the Shirwa Ahmed and Carlos Bledsoe, what can be done to 
prevent individuals from going abroad to conflict zones (particularly if taking a circuitous 
path) or countries like Pakistan and Yemen that have known radical religious and 
educational institutions? 
The creation of a national strategy for countering radicalization would certainly 
have to balance the various constitutional rights, civil liberties, and privacy issues.  
Besides the potential for a public backlash, any questionable measures would play right 
into the narrative of anti-U.S. and anti-government groups. 
E. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
Both the NSCT and NSHS acknowledge the fact the war on terror is as much a 
battle of ideas as it is a battle of arms.  One can argue it is primarily one of ideas, as this 
is what influences individuals to join the battle of arms.  Despite the importance placed 
on ideas, both the NSCT and NSHS are lacking in this regard, especially in a domestic 
setting.  The strategic objective of advancing “effective democracies” offers little in the 
way of countering domestic radicalization as the people, in theory, are already operating 
within the confines of an effective democracy.  The irony of this fact is that democracy 
actually provides an environment where extremists can openly espouse the militant 
ideologies that would not be allowed elsewhere. 
Both strategies have an outward focus concerning countering extremism.  
Although several reports and articles have been published to address the shortcomings of 
the Nation’s counterradicalization efforts, most of the recommendations offered seem 
more of a continuation of themes already addressed in the NSCT and NSHS.  Countering 
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radicalization continues to be primarily focused on populations abroad.  Despite the 
evidence of the threat provided in previous chapters, countering radicalization in the 
homeland appears to be an afterthought. 
Despite the flaws addressed, the NSHS may actually contain the core concept 
needed to counter domestic radicalization.  The NSHS emphasizes the importance of the 
individual in helping to secure the U.S.  “Individual citizens … perform a central role in 
homeland security” (Homeland Security Council, 2007, 41).  Citizen preparedness is 
“among the most effective means of securing the Homeland, and leadership must 
continue at all levels to promote and strengthen their preparedness” (Homeland Security 
Council, 2007, 42).  “To counter fundamental biases toward reactive responses and 
approaches,” the nation must leverage individual initiatives by encouraging and 
rewarding “innovation and new ways of thinking” (Homeland Security Council, 2007, 
41).  Should the Nation’s strategy to counter radicalization not try to leverage the “power 
of the individual,” to make them more resilient to the message of militant ideologies?  
After all, that is exactly what radical ideologies offer, personnel empowerment to help in 
a “valiant” cause.  Once again, the Nation’s strategy should be focused on the same 
“battlefield” as our adversaries. 
Based on the suggestion from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the 
next chapter will look at other countries counterradicalization efforts to determine 
whether there are any lessons learned that could be applied in the U.S. 
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VI. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES FOR COUNTERING 
RADICALIZATION 
As discussed in the last chapter, current U.S. counterterrorism strategy lacks a 
robust domestic radicalization component.  The NSCT primarily has an outward focus 
and barely mentions the homegrown threat.  Furthermore, it does not address how to 
actually counter the radicalization process, domestically or internationally.  Although the 
NSHS mentions the need to prevent domestic radicalization, none of the objectives are 
covered in detail, nor does it articulate how to accomplish this goal. 
Given these shortcomings, one has to look internationally in order to devise a 
counterradicalization strategy.  Unfortunately, the U.S. is not alone in this deficiency, as 
there are very few countries with a government-wide plan for countering radicalization.  
The UN CTITF’s inventory of counterradicalization and deradicalization measures 
implemented by UN Member States identified a wide variety of counterradicalization 
programs, but much like the problem of defining terrorism, defining counterradicalization 
can be challenging.  As the CTITF report reflects, counterradicalization involves both 
preventive and reactive measures.  However, the timing of these measures determines 
their utility in preventing radicalization. 
A. DERADICALIZATION VERSUS COUNTERRADICALIZATION 
Several countries have launched deradicalization efforts, including Egypt, 
Singapore, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Malaysia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
Indonesia (Mohammed, 2009).  These programs have had some level of success in 
influencing individuals and factions of various Egyptian, Algerian, Saudi, Yemeni, 
Jordanian, Tajik, Malaysian, and Indonesian Islamist movements to renounce terrorism 
(Ashour, 2008). 
Egypt’s deradicalization program is one of the more successful, and has been 
quite effective in rehabilitating members of Gama’a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad 
(Gunaratna, 2009).  Gama'a al-Islamiyya has not conducted any armed operations since 
1999 (al-Jihad since 2007) and no significant splits have been identified within the group 
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(Ashour, 2008).  Part of the success is that unlike other deradicalization programs, 
Egypt’s deradicalization effort is not totally a  government initiative; it involves several 
key members of the Egyptian terrorist organizations, such as the former leader of al-Jihad 
(1987–1993) and key al-Qa’ida ideologue, Dr. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also goes by the 
nom de plume Dr. Fadl) (Ashour, 2008).  These leaders play a key role in helping to 
denounce violence and promote a peaceful co-existence with the government.  As a result 
of this program, former Gama'a al-Islamiyya leaders have authored 25 volumes 
supporting their new ideology with both theological and rational arguments (Ashour, 
2008).  These writings, as well as those of al-Shariif, have helped in countering the 
militant Islamist message, much to al-Qa’ida leadership’s dismay. 
While deradicalization programs offer some utility in countering radicalization 
and preventing individuals from being repeat offenders, in theory, comes too late in the 
process.  Most of these programs focus on incarcerated terrorists; therefore, the 
individuals have already exceeded the tipping point.  Besides, there is evidence to show 
deradicalization programs are not always effective in bringing individuals back to 
society’s mainstream.  For example, Said Ali al-Shihri, a former inmate of the 
Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp and participant of Saudi Arabia’s deradicalization 
program, is now deputy commander for al-Qa’ida's operations in Yemen (Mohammed, 
2009).  Al-Shihri is not the only graduate to return to terrorism, Saudi authorities have 
admitted the arrest of nine others (Mohammed, 2009, para. 1). 
The issue of terrorist recidivism is significant.  As many as 74 of the Guantánamo 
Bay detainees (Bumiller, 2009, para. 12) transferred to other countries are believed to be 
engaged in terrorist activity.  With an original prisoner population of 534, this would 
make for a recidivism rate of 14% (Bumiller, 2009, para. 12).  This recidivism rate is not 
purely a product of the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp.  An earlier study (Pluchinsky, 
2008) found there was a tendency for Muslim extremists to become recidivists.  This 
report did not offer a recidivism rate, but it did note that one of the main sources of 
manpower for Islamist groups were released extremists.  Also of significance, is that 
recidivists may be better trained and radicalized because of their incarceration with other 
extremists. 
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Instead of focusing on those who are already radicalized, a counterradicalization 
strategy should focus on preventing individuals from reaching the “tipping point” where 
they feel violence is the only option.  It is logical that if the goal is to prevent individuals 
from becoming a terrorist, a strategy must focus on the early stages of radicalization and 
countering the extremist narrative.  The goal is to keep them on the “ground floor” of 
Moghaddam’s staircase, or the first stage of the NYPD model. 
To help achieve these goals, the UK has developed one of the most 
comprehensive counterradicalization strategies publically available. 
B. UK’S COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY (CONTEST) 
The UK’s strategy for countering terrorism is known as CONTEST; the U.S. 
equivalents to this strategy are the NSHS and NSCT.  Originally released in 2006, the 
document was updated in 2009.  Like the previous version, the strategy consists of four 
components, also known as the “Four Ps:” Prevent, Pursue, Project, and Prepare.  The 
“Four Ps” are very similar to the objectives stated in the NSHS and NSCT, with the 
noticeable difference being the detailed counterradicalization component (Prevent). 
The goal of Prevent is to stop individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting 
violent extremism.  Prevent is based on the assumption that there are five contributing 
factors to radicalization in the UK: 
 An extremist ideology that relies on a distorted interpretation of religion 
and history to legitimize the use of violence; 
 Ideologues and social groups who promote that ideology, facilitate the 
recruitment to support the ideology; and who often operate in open 
institutions in the UK, making effective use of the media; 
 There are individuals receptive to the messaging for a range of personal 
reasons (e.g., identity, faith, frustrated ambition, migration and 
displacement); 
 An absence of resilience in certain communities; and 
 Real or perceived grievances, international and local, that include a 
perception that UK foreign policy is hostile to Islam; the western 
intervention, or to western indifference, is part of a wider conflict 
involving Muslims; and a range of domestic issues (racism, inequalities, 
criminality, and migration) (HM Government, 2009, 82). 
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Based on the previously discussed Pew Research Center data, the disruption of multiple 
terrorist plots, and the outflow of fighters to Somalia, these five planning assumptions are 
valid in a U.S. setting. 
To address these underlying factors, Prevent has five primary objectives (HM 
Government, 2009, 83): 
 Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream 
voices; 
 Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places they 
operate; 
 Support individuals vulnerable to recruitment, or already recruited by 
violent extremists; 
 Increase resilience of communities to violent extremism; and 
 Address the grievances, which ideologues are exploiting. 
These five objectives would also be applicable in a U.S. setting. 
In addition to the Prevent section of CONTEST, there are other documents further 
explaining the strategy and defining the roles of government and non-government 
players.  Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery (HM Government, 
2008a) identifies goals for each of Prevent’s objectives, as well as the key activities.  The 
Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners (HM Government, 2008b) helps local 
authorities and community partners to develop and implement actions in support of 
Prevent.  Besides proving guidance, this document offers numerous examples of what has 
been accomplished under Prevent.  Preventing violent extremism - Winning hearts and 
minds (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007) focuses on solutions 
at the local level for building civic capacity and strengthening the role of faith-based 
institutions.  Preventing Violent Extremism: Pathfinder Fund (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2007) provides guidance and establishes priorities 
for the funding of counterradicalization programs.  Collectively these documents 
represent one of the most in-depth and detailed counterradicalization strategies. 
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C. ASSESSING PREVENT’S APPLICABILITY TO THE U.S. 
Using the Prevent objectives as a framework, this section will look at what the 
UK government feels are the keys to success and determine whether these objectives are 
applicable in creating a U.S. counterradicalization strategy. 
1. Challenge the Ideology behind Violent Extremism and Support 
Mainstream Voices 
 
This objective maps back to countering the message that legitimizes the use of 
violence.  Prevent calls for government to work with Muslim scholars, faith-based 
groups, and other influential “voices” in order to provide a more realistic understanding 
of Islam to help counter the corrupted message.  Regarding this objective, there is nothing 
unique to the UK environment preventing this from being incorporated into a U.S. 
strategy.  In fact, it is recommended that countering the narrative is the cornerstone of not 
only the U.S.’s counterradicalization strategy, but its counterterrorism strategy as well.  
Failure to address radicalization in the homeland makes an external counterterrorism 
strategy almost pointless. 
Keys to success: 
 The voices of violent extremists do not go unchallenged; 
 People are able to access a wider range of alternative, authoritative 
views about Islam and participate in debate; 
 Communities have an increased range of tools and support to help them 
in rejecting violent extremism; and 
 Mainstream voices overseas are amplified to resonate with local 
counterparts (HM Government, 2008, 4). 
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2. Disrupt Those who Promote Violent Extremism and Support the 
Places They Operate 
 
The focus of this objective is disrupting the “messenger” from distributing the 
message.  As evident with the keys to success, this part of Prevent is heavily focused on 
the Internet.  In fact, two pages of the strategy are dedicated to this issue, which is not 
surprising as the Internet allows radicalization to happen anywhere, including the U.S. 
Internet denial-of-service tools to counter this medium are an attractive option.  
However, a common theme related to using network exploitation tools in a homeland 
setting is the impact on the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens, particularly those 
provided by the First and Fourth Amendments.  While the objective is applicable, the 
means to accomplish would be different given the U.S. legal environment. 
3. Support Individuals Vulnerable to Recruitment, or Already Recruited 
by Violent Extremists 
 
Keys to success: 
 Fewer individuals are drawn into violent extremism and more actively 
reject the messages of violent extremists; 
 Multi-agency initiatives work closely with community representatives 
to identify individuals at risk and to develop interventions to support 
them; and 
 The public is more aware of the role police and other agencies can play 
in support of vulnerable individuals (HM Government, 2008, 6). 
Keys to success: 
 Organizations such as prisons, colleges and universities are prepared to 
resist the influence of violent extremists; 
 Violent extremists find it more difficult to promulgate their messages 
over the internet; and 
 Communities, authorities, and parents, have tools to filter extremist 
media on the Internet (HM Government, 2008, 5). 
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This objective has both counterradicalization and deradicalization applications.  
There is also a significant law enforcement outreach aspect that may have limited utility 
in the U.S.  Since 2001, U.S. efforts to address radicalization have primarily focused on 
using law enforcement as a community outreach tool.  However, these efforts are not 
necessarily oriented on preventing radicalization as much as they are at identifying those 
already radicalized.  Besides, law enforcement might be limited to the inroads they can 
make into these communities.  As the Pew Research Center poll found, the majority of 
the Muslim American population is of foreign origin, and most come from countries 
under authoritarian rule.  Based on prior negative experiences in their original countries, 
they might be suspicious of law enforcement led programs.  A point validated by the 
findings that many Muslim Americans worry about U.S. Government surveillance, 
discrimination, and harassment. 
4. Increase the Resilience of Communities to Violent Extremism 
 
The overwhelming majority of people in all communities in the UK reject violent 
extremism, but not all have the capacity and information to effectively challenge it (HM 
Government, 2009).  This statement would likely hold true for some Muslim Americans.  
This objective’s intent is to support individuals and groups (public and private) that are 
able to provide positive alternatives to those who may be drawn to extremist activity. 
Based on the recent appearance of radical behavior in Somali-American 
communities, this is an area needing to be addressed in U.S. strategy.  However, this is 
not an issue limited to one ethnic or religious group.  The disruption of multiple domestic 
terrorist plots since 2001 shows radicalization has crossed many demographic 
Keys to success: 
 Communities actively challenge and resist violent extremists. 
 Countries with strong links to the UK will also implement work to 
support communities overseas. 
 Local partnerships and projects with faith institutions and leaders are 
strengthened (HM Government, 2008, 7). 
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boundaries.  Building community resiliency will help to address these perceptions by 
providing the capacity and information needed to effectively challenge militant 
ideologies. 
5. Address the Grievances that Exploit Ideologues  
 
Extremists attempt to exploit and create grievances to justify their acts of 
violence.  Some of these grievances reflect the domestic experiences of individuals: 
racism, discrimination, inequalities, lack of social mobility, and underemployment.  
Other grievances are based on perceptions of the host country’s foreign policy.  While 
some of these issues are valid, others are perceptions based on individuals being 
misinformed, either purposely by extremists or not having access to information 
regarding U.S. Government policies or the knowledge of the resources available to them. 
Certainly, this objective is applicable to the U.S.  As discussed in Chapter IV, 
most U.S. Muslims expressed relatively little support for the war on terrorism and many 
opposed military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Additionally, there was a 
perception that U.S. Government counterterrorism efforts singled out Muslims.  More 
than half of those polled felt life for Muslims had become more difficult since 9/11.  
These sentiments were validated by another poll showing “Americans [58% polled] see 
Muslims as facing more discrimination inside the U.S. than other major religious groups” 
(Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2009, 1).  Creating platforms for 
individuals and communities to air their grievances and having access to senior level 
government officials will help to counter misinformation and the resulting 
misperceptions. 
Keys to success: 
 There are more ‘safe spaces’ for individuals and groups to discuss and 
work through difficult and emotive issues. 
 There is greater engagement from Government in these discussions, to 
tackle ill-founded grievances and increase dialogue and understanding 
around contentious subjects (HM Government, 2008, 8). 
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D. POTENTIAL ISSUES 
Implementing a strategy like Prevent in the U.S. has its risks.  Some aspects could 
infringe on the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.  Other aspects, if not implemented 
correctly, could actually facilitate the delivery of the extremist message. 
The most commonly discussed issue to countering politically or religiously 
oriented messages in a homeland setting, is the impact on the constitutional rights of U.S. 
citizens.  Some are quick to draw a parallel between countering child pornography and 
countering extremist literature, and that the measures to counter the former could be used 
for the latter.  However, the legal framework for taking action against child pornography 
and extremist content is quite different.  International laws against child pornography are 
clear-cut.  Just as it is hard to define terrorism, terrorism-related content is not a readily 
definable category, and the line between such content and legitimate political expression 
may not always be clear.  Specifically targeting Islamists or any other Islamic centric 
content could infringe on First Amendment rights. 
Another potential constitutional rights issue is related to the Fourth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution: Measures to monitor the Internet could entail the unwarranted 
capture and retention of private communications data from ordinary citizens.  The 
argument is whether the gain from exploiting the Internet is worth the possible 
infringements on civil liberties and personal privacy. 
In addition to these civil liberty issues, there is concern that measures to counter 
extremist usage of the Internet may violate international laws and treaties.  Many of the 
computer systems, networks, and Internet service providers are located overseas.  
Lacking an international treaty, there would be cases where the U.S. would have to take 
unilateral action to deny extremists access to the Internet.  Given the legal ramifications 
(domestic and international), such acts are unlikely. 
Returning to constitutional issues, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution comes into play when considering Prevent initiatives, such as the Channel 
Program.  The Channel Program is a law enforcement-led program intended to identify 
individuals vulnerable to violent extremism and through community-based intervention 
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move them to other areas across the UK, not necessarily on their own accordance (HM 
Government, 2009).  The legality of such a program would have to be determined before 
it could be introduced in the U.S. 
Another aspect of Prevent is the reliance on domestic intelligence to allow 
authorities to better target related interventions.  The most significant difference between 
the U.S. and the UK is the legal authority to conduct domestic intelligence operations and 
the restrictions imposed on such operations.  To start with, the UK does not have an 
equivalent of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) (West, 2006).  
The UK’s Security Service (MI5) is empowered to tap telephones, intercept mail and 
other communications, and conduct covert operations on just the authority of a senior 
minister (West, 2006).  Comparatively, the FBI conducts domestic intelligence operations 
within a very strict legal framework, often requiring a court order.  Besides the potential 
for intelligence oversight violations, it would be unlikely the American public would 
support the loosening of such restrictions on agencies responsible for collecting domestic 
intelligence. 
In addition to constitutional rights and legal authorities, there are other issues, 
particularly in identifying individuals and groups for the engagement aspect.  A report 
released by Policy Exchange claimed Prevent was not working for this reason (Maher 
and Frampton, 2009).  One of the reports claims it is flawed in theory.  The flaw is that 
some within the British government were convinced that non-violent extremists (e.g., 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir) were the solution to winning over the youth 
(Maher and Frampton, 2009).  As a result, some of those chosen to win over the "hearts 
and minds" were actually at the forefront of attacking the UK's foreign policy.  The effect 
was to empower radical Islamists within some communities, while at the same time 
marginalizing moderates (Maher and Frampton, 2009). 
Obviously, choosing the right people and groups to interact with the public is 
crucial to the success of a counterradicalization strategy.  Selecting the “wrong” voices 
can result in the wrong message getting out.  In one case, an Imam was asked by the West 
Midlands Police to give a presentation on Islam.  Instead, he used the opportunity to 
preach an anti-West message (Maher and Frampton, 2009).  The Policy Exchange report 
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identifies several other examples where British authorities had unknowingly worked with 
groups having radical Islamist agendas (e.g., the UK Islamic Mission, the Muslim 
Council of Britain, and the Islamic Society of Britain) (Maher and Frampton, 2009). 
A U.S. strategy could face similar problems.  As previously discussed, radical 
Islamist influences exist within U.S. Muslim communities.  Given the presence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and al-Muhajiroun in some Muslim American 
communities, it is probable some of their supporters could inadvertently be selected as 
credible voices. 
The second issue identified in the report was that Prevent is flawed in practice, 
due to its primary delivery method of local government and law enforcement.  According 
to the report, these groups lack the knowledge and expertise to distinguish between the 
various agendas of Muslim groups, in particular, those with political Islamist agendas.  
As a result, local councils and police forces have made several mistakes in selecting 
community partners.  In some cases, the local authorities actually helped to fund 
extremist-influenced organizations (Maher and Frampton, 2009). 
Despite these potential problems, as already discussed, there are just as many 
successes.  Training could overcome the issues addressed in the Policy Exchange report.  
Additionally, adequate vetting and confirmation of credentials of individuals and groups 
will help prevent selecting the wrong “voices.”  As for the delivery method, a strategy 
that provides a multi-discipline solution incorporating both a “top down” (government 
sponsored) and “bottom up” (community sponsored) approach should allow for the 
appropriate “mix” of expertise to avoid many of the issues identified in this section. 
E. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
Chapters III and IV discussed the increasing threat posed by domestic 
radicalization.  Given this trend, it was argued there is a need to prevent radicalization 
from spreading and turning into a more direct threat to the Nation’s security.  Chapter V 
showed that the U.S. counterterrorism strategy was lacking in regards to countering 
radicalization.  In this chapter, other countries counterradicalization efforts were analyzed 
to see whether there are any lessons learned that could be applied in the U.S. 
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The UN CTITF’s inventory of counterradicalization and deradicalization 
programs reflected a wide variety of measures, both preventive and reactive.  However, 
there are few countries with an all-encompassing counterradicalization strategy 
addressing all aspects of radicalization, the exception being the UK.  In addition to the 
Prevent section of CONTEST, there are supporting documents further explaining the 
strategy and defining the roles of government and non-government players.  Collectively, 
these documents offer one of the most in depth and detailed strategies to counter 
radicalization. 
However, there are some aspects of Prevent that are not applicable or easily 
exportable to the U.S., as they could potentially impact the constitutional rights of U.S. 
citizens, particularly those provided by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution.  In addition, the legal authorities provided to UK law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies are in some cases less restrictive when compared to those of 
U.S. counterparts.  Intelligence oversight issues are also a concern when integrating 
domestic intelligence into community-based counterradicalization efforts.  While the 
means to accomplish would have to be different given the U.S. legal environment, the 
Prevent objectives serve as an excellent starting point in constructing a 
counterradicalization strategy for the U.S. 
Chapters VII and VIII will look at two strategy approaches for countering 
radicalization.  One is purely a technical solution focused at countering extremist use of 
the Internet.  The other approach offers a far more encompassing solution. 
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VII. A TECHNICAL SOLUTION FOR COUNTERING 
RADICALIZATION  
The literature review highlighted the Internet’s increasing role in radicalization.  
Prior to September 2001, there were approximately 80 Islamic extremist sites online; by 
2007, there were close to 8,000 (Kotler, 2007, para. 2).  Some of these forums had up to 
20,000 members and half a million postings (Kotler, 2007, para. 7).  Unfortunately, the 
Internet’s impact goes well beyond radicalization, it has fundamentally changed how 
terrorist groups operate.  Just as society has benefited from Web2.0 technology, so have 
terrorists who now use the Internet for a variety of purposes including information 
sharing, research and data mining, operational planning, publicity and propaganda, fund 
raising, recruitment, and training.  Additionally, the Internet provides an environment 
where it is possible to create a virtual terrorist network composed of individuals who are 
not personally known to each other but who are linked by a common ideology and a 
willingness to coordinate actions in pursuit of it. 
Based on the significant role the Internet plays in the radicalization process and 
day-to-day operations, any counterterrorism strategy needs to consider incorporating 
tools to counter extremist use of this medium.  However, this issue is much broader and 
more complex than bringing down a few Web sites.  Besides the technical solutions 
necessary to accomplish this task, there are policy and legal issues to consider. 
A. TECHNICAL MEANS FOR COUNTERING EXTREMIST USE OF THE 
INTERNET 
To eliminate, or at least disrupt, the extremists’ capability to utilize the Internet 
there are two primary courses of action: targeting the hardware or the data.  This can be 
accomplished through electronic or kinetic means.  However, given the legal and political 
implications of kinetically attacking computer systems or networks, either domestically 
or internationally, the focus of this section will be on the digital means. 
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The most obvious means to block Internet content is for Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) to use Webfiltering, or content-control software.  As the name implies, 
web-filtering software blocks the content available on a network.  While possibly the 
easiest tool to use, it is also the most controversial and likely to draw public criticism as 
this has freedom of speech and censorship implications.  Depending on how the filters are 
implemented, it could actually affect legitimate organizations. 
Another option, and one that can target specific computers and networks, is the 
use of malicious software, sometimes referred to as malware.  Malware consists of 
computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware.  As most users of the Internet have 
likely experienced, these programs are quite prevalent.  As indicated in the Symantec 
Internet Security Threat Report (2008), malware is becoming easier to obtain and use, 
and already widely deployed.  In 2007, there were 54,609 unique applications deployed 
on Microsoft Windows PCs, 65% considered malicious (Symantec, 2008, 21).  It is 
assessed that the release rate of malicious code has surpassed legitimate software 
applications.  The wide spread availability offers an “attacker” a certain level of 
anonymity or plausible deniability. 
A similar, but more complex, option for denying service is the use of “bot 
networks,” commonly referred to as botnets.  Botnets consist of computers infected with 
malware, which can be operated in unison to disrupt or block Internet traffic, collect 
information, or affect other computers.  As identified in the report Botnets, Cybercrime, 
and Cyberterrorism:  Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress (Wilson, 2008), 
botnets are very effective in disrupting computer systems due to the number of infected 
computers at any given time.  Approximately 1,400 command and control servers 
(Wilson, 2008, 6) were found to be active on the Internet in 2007.  The number of 
computers controlled by these 1,400 servers was estimated at more than 3 million 
(Wilson, 2008, 6).  The number of infected computers had steadily increased with the 
Symantec Corporation (2008) reporting it had detected over 5 million bot-infected 




is a strong likelihood many of the computers used by extremists are already part of a third 
party botnet and could be easily exploited.  Once again, the widespread availability 
provides a level of plausible deniability for U.S. Government. 
As demonstrated by recent cyber clashes between Sunni and Shiite extremists, 
denial-of-service operations are quite effective.  In September 2008, Sunni hackers 
targeted 300 sites (Knickmeyer, 2008, para. 23) operated by Shiite religious leaders 
including the official site of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq.  
In retaliation, hundreds of sites and forums used by Sunni extremists, including al-
Qa’ida, were disabled (Knickmeyer, 2008, para. 25).  While denial-of-service operations 
to counter extremist access to the Internet are attractive, as mentioned, there are policy 
and legal issues to take into account. 
B. POLICY ISSUES AND LIMITING FACTORS 
An issue discussed in Chapters V and VI, in regards to using network exploitation 
tools or denial-of-service operations in the U.S., is the impact on the constitutional rights 
of U.S. citizens.  In particular, the rights provided by the First and Fourth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution.  In addition to domestic civil liberty issues, denial-of-service 
operations could violate international laws and treaties. 
Many of the computer systems, networks, and ISP servers are located overseas.  
Thus, targeting these networks has international law and diplomatic implications.  As 
demonstrated by Russia’s use of computer network attack options against Estonia and 
Georgia, such efforts can easily result in international involvement.  The cyber attacks 
against Estonia resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization coming to the 
assistance of the Estonian government with help in restoring its computer systems and 
investigating the source of the attacks (Germain, 2008, para. 8).  In the case of Georgia, 
the government relocated its Web sites to U.S. servers (Germain, 2008, para. 11). 
Complicating cyber attack options, some foreign-based extremist Web sites 
actually reside on servers located in the U.S.  The Afghan Taliban and other Islamist 
militants have used U.S. based companies to broadcast propaganda and videos of attacks 
on U.S. and allied troops (Warrick and Rondeaux, 2009).  It is also believed that U.S. 
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Internet services were used to make Internet phone calls during the 2008 Mumbai 
terrorist attack (Warrick and Rondeaux, 2009).  Ironically, these incidents have led to 
international pressure for the U.S. to do more to restrict extremist access to such services. 
One international treaty that could help to address these issues is the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime.  This convention is the first international treaty 
designed to address crimes committed via the Internet and other computer networks.  To 
date, 38 of 46 members and 5 non-members (the U.S., Canada, Japan, Montenegro, and 
South Africa) have signed the Convention (Archick, 2006, 1).  However, one of the 
potential issues is that the signatories of the Convention’s negotiations are not necessarily 
the problem countries in which cyber criminals operate freely.  It could be assumed that, 
in some cases, this would be true for extremists.  Therefore, even if the U.S. entered into 
similar agreements, there would still be cases where the U.S. would have to take 
unilateral action to deny extremists access to the Internet. 
Another significant issue in regards to network attacks is the second order of 
effects.  During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. reportedly did not carry out computer 
network attacks against non-military Iraqi systems out of fear of affecting friendly 
countries (Wilson, 2006).  For example, U.S. officials rejected cyber attacks against Iraqi 
financial computers because Iraq’s banking network was connected to European financial 
networks.  These concerns were present during an armed conflict, so it is likely the U.S. 
Government would be even more hesitant to use this in less lethal situations, unless there 
were guarantees non-terrorist entities would not be impacted. 
Given the potential second order of effects and legal issues associated with denial-
of-service attacks, the utility of these options is marginal until agreements similar to the 
Convention of Cybercrime are reached to address extremist use of the Internet. 
C. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
While the first policy inclination may be to directly target the virtual safe haven 
and negate the means of delivering extremist content, the ability of the U.S. Government 
to disrupt use of the Internet as a tool for radicalization, or day-to-day operations for that 
matter, appears minimal.  Countering radicalization over the Internet is not easy.  
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Extremist use of the Internet is constantly in flux, with Web sites appearing and 
disappearing regularly.  While there are several technical tools to help counter extremist 
use of the Internet, there are also policy, civil liberty and legal issues that influence their 
usage, particularly in regards to computer or network attack options. 
Despite the challenges in implementing the solutions addressed in this report, the 
U.S. should not limit the “cyber arsenal” it can use for countering terrorism.  There are 
certainly scenarios where denial-of-service attacks could disrupt the planning and 
execution of terrorist operations.  However, in the end, technical solutions offer minimal 
utility in countering radicalization.  While the Internet can facilitate the radicalization of 
an individual, it is not the source of the problem. 
 Identity issues of individuals, such as a personal sense of alienation, perception 
of marginalization, political oppression, discrimination, poverty, and perceived wrong 
doings of foreign policy, and a desire to accomplish something important, will not be 
addressed by bringing down radical Web sites.  In fact, it may actually fuel the 
radicalization process.  Besides the civil liberty issues, such action could easily be 
interpreted as censorship and exploited by those trying to be countered in the first place. 
In the end, winning the battle of ideas will not be accomplished on a cyber 
battlefield.  As demonstrated by recent events in Iran, no matter how hard a government 
tries to prevent the spread of individual thought, where there is a will there are means to 
circumvent.  This partially reflects what was described in Chapter III as the “power of the 
individual.”  Instead of focusing on blocking individual access to extremist material, the 
focus should be on making individuals more resilient and less receptive to the radical 
message.  By increasing resiliency, the power of the individual can be tapped to counter 
extremism.  The next chapter will propose how to accomplish. 
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VIII. A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SOLUTION FOR COUNTERING 
RADICALIZATION 
The U.S. faces a diverse terrorist threat.  Other than a desire for change, the only 
commonalty among the various extremist movements (transnational and domestic) is that 
these groups are made up of radicalized individuals.  These individuals are the key to the 
success of movements and to their demise.  Without followers, sympathizers, and 
supporters, a movement will most certainly die.  To defeat the threat requires winning 
over the minds of current participants, as well as dissuading future recruits.  This cerebral 
battleground is where a counterradicalization strategy must focus. 
Reaching these individuals before it is too late is the challenge.  Just as the 
terrorist threat has evolved, so has the radicalization process.  Radicalization is no longer 
something emanating from madrassas and training camps overseas, it is taking place in 
such locations as Minneapolis and Raleigh.  No longer requiring face-to-face contact, 
individuals are now self-radicalizing via the Internet.  Furthermore, the Internet is 
allowing the radicalization process to proceed at an accelerated pace.  Unfortunately, the 
Nation’s efforts to counter this process appear to be lagging behind. 
The UK’s Prevent component offers a conceptual framework for countering 
radicalization in the U.S.  Unfortunately, creating a U.S. counterradicalization strategy is 
not as simple as replacing UK with U.S.  As noted in the ASPI and CACP analysis, 
Prevent is not “transferable wholesale” due to differences in each country’s homeland 
security setting.  Just as radicalization is a function of the environment in which people 
live, so is the strategy to counter.  Thus, while accomplishing the same goal, a 
counterradicalization strategy for one country will look different from one of another.  
Helping to shape a country’s strategy are the legal framework in which government 
authorities operate and the constitutional rights provided to its citizens.  Nevertheless, 
there are lessons learned through the UK and other countries’ attempts to counter 
radicalization that can be applied to a U.S. strategy. 
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The following observations and recommendations are by no means all inclusive.  
This sampling is intended to illustrate the diverse range of options the U.S. has available 
to counter domestic radicalization. 
A. COUNTERING THE NARRATIVE 
A compelling ideology and narrative are crucial to any extremist movement, as 
these frame the actions of a group, or individual.  Both are also important in maintaining 
an individual’s commitment to extremist activities and group cohesion.  However, it is 
not just the message that factors into the radicalization process.  As Moghaddam said, an 
ideology does not influence behavior in a vacuum, a combination of conditions and 
contributing factors must be present. 
Individuals become receptive to a particular message for a range of personal 
reasons (e.g., identity, faith, frustrated ambition, migration, and displacement).  
Ultimately, all the contributing factors need addressing to completely counter 
radicalization.  However, as a starting point, the first step is countering the narrative 
fueling the radicalization process.  Simply placing doubt in the mind of those most 
vulnerable may be enough to disrupt the entire process. 
Take for instance al-Qa’ida’s core narrative, which is the West and its allies seek 
to destroy Islam, Muslims must fight against this threat, and just rule under Islamic law is 
the reward for expelling Western influence.  In its most basic sense, this is intended to 
represent a clash of civilizations.  Islam and Muslims are at risk of annihilation.  Groups 
from al-Qa’ida to Hizb ut-Tahrir have found it relatively easy to mobilize followers with 
this simple argument.  Thus, the challenge is countering the effectiveness of this message.  
Ironically, Shaikh Abu Yahya al-Libi has provided the U.S. a tip to accomplish this 
objective.  Al-Libi says the key is to turn the “Jihadist Movement’s” own weaknesses 
against it (Brachman, 2007). 
What is this weakness?  Sageman (2008) believes “the main threat to radical 
Islamist terrorism is the fact it is self-limiting” and “it will most likely disappear for 
internal reasons” (42) because of al-Qa’ida’s tactics.  Given the earlier examples of 
fractures within LIFG, AQIM, and JI (Chapter II), Sageman is not too far off track.  This 
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is also supported by polling data from the non-profit organization Terror Free Tomorrow, 
which found al-Qa’ida’s tactics were a contributing factor in the group’s decreasing 
popularity in such key places as Saudi Arabia (2007) and Pakistan (2008).  This 
illustrates the militant Islamist movement, whether al-Qa'ida focused or as a “leaderless 
jihad,” is at the mercy of its followers.  What attracts followers during one stage may not 
work in another.  Based on Sageman’s reasoning, the goal of a counterradicalization 
strategy needs to reduce the “popularity” of terrorism by negating the “glory.” 
Returning to al-Libi’s advice, the focus should be on pointing out how “bankrupt” 
the ideology is and that “it is al-Qaeda, and not the West, that is truly at war with Islam” 
(Levitt and Jacobson, 2008, para. 6).  This is best accomplished by highlighting how 
many Muslims are victims of militant Islamic terrorism.  In 2007, Muslims made up more 
than 50% of the victims in al-Qa’ida attacks and approximately 100 mosques were 
attacked (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008, para. 6).  A trend continuing in 2008, with well over 
50% of the approximately 50,000 people killed or injured by terrorist attacks being 
Muslim (NCTC, 2009, 12).  Thus, the counter narrative is “The Jihadi message is so 
weak and unappealing that they have to use violence to persuade people” (McCants, 
2006, 2). 
1. Using “Credible Voices” to Counter the Narrative 
Communicating this message is not easily accomplished.  Despite the facts above, 
the audience for this message is unlikely to believe the U.S. Government; after all, it is 
kafir (the concealer of truth).  Al-Libi offers some more advice, efforts to weaken al-
Qa’ida’s message should focus on using ex-militants who have renounced terrorism and 
recanted their extremist views.  These “credible voices” are crucial to creating doubt in 
those considering joining the militant Islamist movement.  As mentioned in Chapter VI, 
one of these credible voices is Sayyed Imam al-Sharif.  This one time associate of Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, released a book renouncing terrorism called  Wathiqat Tarshid Al-'Aml Al-
Jihadi fi Misr w'Al-'Alam (Document to Rationalizing Jihadi Action in Egypt and the 
World) (2007) (Rashwan, 2008).  To understand the significance of this book it must be 
compared to al-Sharif’s early writings.  Al-'Umda fi I'dad al-'Udda (The Essentials of 
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Preparing for Jihad) (1988) was originally written to provide the philosophical and 
religious underpinnings for Mujahideen efforts during the Soviet-Afghan War and it is 
still used today as a text for Islamist groups, including al-Qa’ida  (Rashwan, 2008, 88).  
Then there is Al-Jami’ fi Talab Al-Ilm Al-Sharif (The Compendium for the Pursuit of 
Divine Knowledge) (1993) which provides the “theoretical, doctrinal, and legal 
foundation for the Jihadi movement” (Rashwan, 2008, 89). 
Al-Qa’ida, or at least al-Zawahiri, reacted immediately to refute al-Sharif’s last 
book, with his own, Al-Tabri’ah (Disavowing) (Bakier, 2008b).  The fact that al-Zawahiri 
felt inclined to respond so quickly reflects al-Qa’ida leadership’s fear that credible voices 
can cause significant damage to their movement. 
In the UK, a source of “credible voices” is the Quilliam Foundation, founded by 
Maajid Nawaz (2008) and Ed Husain (2007), formerly of the UK branch of Hizb ut-
Tahrir.  Not only were Nawaz and Husain highly placed in the organization, but they 
were also successful recruiters and established numerous cells.  More importantly, after 
being incarcerated for their activities, they actually studied Islam and are now able to 
expose those beliefs Islamist groups distort in order to justify their actions.  Based on 
their experiences from entering at the grassroots levels, being groomed for leadership 
positions, and acquiring an academic understanding of the religion, Nawaz and Husain 
have an insider’s perspective how militant Islamists can influence a person, and how to 
best create a counter narrative so a person on the street can relate. 
Recommendation: The U.S. Government should help provide a platform to 
maximize the amplitude of credible voices, as well as help establish and assist with 
funding organizations similar to the Quilliam Foundation, both abroad and domestically. 
2. Leveraging the News Media 
Delivering the “credible” message to the intended audience requires news media 
support.  Given al-Sharif’s status in the militant Islamist movement, his ideological 
reversal is momentous; however, English-language media provided only minor coverage 
(Brachman, 2007).  Obviously, the non-coverage of such an ideological shift reflects few 
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in the media understand the importance of legitimacy to groups like al-Qa’ida.  The U.S. 
Government needs to work with the media to ensure such stories get maximum coverage. 
Recommendation: To ensure the widest dissemination and understanding of 
news worthy events, DNI should consider issuing press releases, as done by DOJ, to help 
put such events into context so the public is better informed.  The U.S. Government 
cannot allow extremist organizations to control the media. 
3. Public Service Announcements 
The government’s use of the media should not be limited to news updates.  
Another option is to use media campaigns similar to those used for the war on drugs and 
drinking and driving (e.g., “This is Your Brain on Drugs”, “Just say No,” and “Friends 
Don’t let Friends Drive Drunk” campaigns).  Along these lines, in 2005, Saudi Arabia 
began a media campaign characterized as “just say No to terrorism” which included TV 
spots of a father who had lost his son, a terrorist, in a suicide attack, and others on the 
roots of terrorism (Schuster, 2006).  In 2009, the British government launched a similar 
advertising campaign (called “I am the West”) aimed at preventing Pakistanis from 
participating in extremist activity.  This campaign consisted of nine 30-second television 
commercials, supported by radio commercials, broadcasted over multiple Pakistani 
channels during a three-month period (Butt, 2009).  The intent is to introduce this 
campaign in other potential problem countries, such as Yemen, Indonesia, and Egypt. 
The main idea behind a counterradicalization media campaign is to use “simple 
rhetoric and strong symbols” (Speckhard, 2007, 19) that create revulsion instead of 
acceptance of terrorism.  Commercials focusing on Muslim victims and destruction of 
mosques, with commentary of former extremists, would send a very strong message.  
Media campaigns can also be used to “strengthen the social focus on the benefits of 
integration and positive participation in society” (Pressman, 2006, 18). 
Recommendation:  The U.S. Government should fund counterradicalization 
media campaigns.  However, these campaigns must not focus on a particular religion or 
ethnic group; they need to address the entire extremist spectrum. 
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4. Educational Programs to Counter Radical Ideologies 
Government sponsored public service announcements may not reach the intended 
audience, so other vehicles are required to connect with them, such as in the classroom.  
This concept 1991).  At one point, 5,000 schools and other community agencies 
nationwide (Gaustad, 1991, para. 15) were using this program.  Then there is the Gang 
Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) Program administered by the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, which focuses on conflict-resolution and offers training in empathy, 
cooperation, and perspective taking, to help individuals settle differences peacefully. 
Approximately 400 communities across the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam are using this program (G.R.E.A.T. 
Organizational Chart, n.d.). 
These prevention programs could be tailored to address politically motivated 
violence.  For example, in the UK, the Department for Children, Schools, and Families 
created a toolkit to help schools deal with extremism.  The toolkit provides information 
about what can cause violent extremism, help schools to empower students to create 
communities more resilient to extremism, and protect those vulnerable to being drawn 
into violent extremist activity (Department for Children, Schools, and Families, 2008) 
Recommendation: The U.S. Department of Education (DOE) should help fund 
public school systems to develop counterradicalization modules that could be added to 
existing violence prevention programs, as well as produce toolkits to help educators in 
developing programs tailored to their student populations. 
5. Non-Traditional Educational Programs to Counter Radical Ideologies 
Education does not have to be limited to the classroom.  In fact, other media may 
be more successful in delivering a counter narrative.  According to Hartwig Moeller, 
head of the North Rhine-Westphalia Department of Germany’s Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz: “Alternative educational platforms are a valuable tool in the effort to 
speak out against terrorism.  The U.S. should leverage these non-traditional mediums in 
its effort to counter the militant message.” 
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B. PROMOTING POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES AND OUTREACH 
PROGRAMS 
Countering the militant narrative is not enough.  Former extremists have stated 
they turned to individuals who were willing to discuss politics when mainstream religious 
figures refused (Leiter, 2008).  Potential extremists want to make an impact, so they need 
to be provided with alternatives allowing them to accomplish this.  Al-Libi suggests, 
“strengthening and backing Islamic movements far removed from Jihad, particularly 
those with a democratic approach” (Brachman, 2007, para. 13). 
Unlike the law enforcement-based programs already discussed, the outreach 
programs being proposed need to demonstrate that political alternatives and solutions 
exist, and groups can be effective on a political level without resorting to violence.  Such 
an outreach program is the UK’s Radical Middle Way project. 
The Radical Middle Way is a partnership between several youth-oriented Muslim 
organizations and the British government, which displays the views of Muslim scholarly 
and intellectual voices.  According to The Radical Middle Way Web site, they are an 
intellectual and theological movement “aimed at articulating a relevant mainstream 
understanding of Islam that is dynamic, proactive and relevant to young British Muslims 
(The Radical Middle Way, para.  1).  The key term here is “relevant.”  If the intended 
audience sees no relevancy in what is being said, the counter narrative will go unheard. 
While law enforcement should not be the primary means of outreach, the London 
Metropolitan Police’s Muslim Contact Unit shows how law enforcement still has a role.  
The Muslim Contact Unit, working with the UK branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was 
instrumental in the successful rehabilitation of the Finsbury Park Mosque (former home 
of the radical imam, Abu Hamza al-Masri) (Mandaville, 2008). 
Recommendation: The U.S. Government should help establish and fund 
outreach programs like The Radical Middle Way.  Exposure to a variety of Islamic 
perspectives on non-Islamic issues will help make individuals better prepared to resist 
militant interpretations. 
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C. LEVERAGING COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 
While the previous examples focused on things government and local authorities 
can do, local communities can also assist.  Being on the “front line,” they can detect 
indications at an early stage and help to shelter those most vulnerable to radicalization.  
This is particularly important in regards to a homegrown threat.  Lacking access to core 
extremists or groups, friends, family members, authority figures, and the Internet often 
introduce individuals to extremism.  In the case of the 2005 London attacks, Mohammad 
Sidique Khan, believed responsible for recruiting and radicalizing at least two of the 
bombers, was a teaching assistant and “mentor” at a youth center (Leiter, 2008). 
While not specifically aimed at countering political extremism, an example of 
community engagement that is applicable to this discussion is provided by Long Beach, 
California. In the early 1990s, Long Beach was experiencing a situation where cultural 
diversity and immigration was leading to cultural clashes among the youth population 
resulting in gang involvement and criminal activity (Blancarte and Azeka, 1992).  This 
led to the development of a program to channel at-risk youth into positive activities. 
The components of this program included: 
 School classroom anti-gang instruction; 
 Recreational programming; 
 Employment training and development; 
 Collaborative peer counseling program between the school district and the 
parks and recreational department; 
 Training for service providers to at-risk youth; 
 Resource directory of services provided to at-risk youth in the area; and 
 Parent education (Blancarte and Azeka, 1992, 32). 
Recommendation: A proposed community-based program involves local Muslim 
civic leaders and businesspersons serving as “big brothers and sisters” to Muslim youths 
most likely to be vulnerable to the radical Islamic ideology.  Another option is the 
creation of a scholarship fund for Muslim students specializing in counseling and related 
areas, with the “payback” being these individuals return to their respective communities 
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to work with Muslim youth programs.  Similar programs should be established for all 
communities dealing with extreme and violent behavior (political and non-political). 
D. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
A counterterrorism strategy focused only on security and law enforcement 
measures can actually incite others to take action, as with the case of U.S. operations 
abroad.  Based on this unintended consequence, a non-coercive approach is the best 
option, particularly if the goal is countering domestic radicalization. 
To effectively deal with radicalization in the homeland requires government 
(local, State, and Federal), faith-based and community organizations, and businesses to 
become partners.  These institutions must work together in order to produce resilient 
individuals.  If these systems fail, organizations, such as gangs or extremist groups, can 
move in to fill the void, allowing radicalization to take root.  By participating in these 
fringe elements, individuals can achieve an identity, prestige, and a sense of belonging 
that does not exist in their lives. 
Individuals can be taught about nonviolent methods to voice their opinions and 
that terrorism is a criminal act.  Addressing radicalism early on prepares them ahead of 
time to reject extremist appeals.  While it has not been necessarily proven that violent 
behavior has been reduced by the programs mentioned in this chapter, there is evidence 
that violence prevention curriculum has changed attitudes toward violent organizations 
(i.e., gangs) (Gaustad, 1991).  An analysis of the G.R.E.A.T. program in Tennessee 
schools showed that while it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of such programs, 
students tend to understand the concepts and were “excited and eager to participate” 
(Ramsey, Rust, and Sobel, 2003, 306).  If anything, such programs can help to plant a 
seed of doubt and establish a foothold in the minds of those vulnerable to radical 
messages. 
Just as important is community involvement.  As with existing violence 
prevention programs in the public school system, there is no need to reinvent the wheel in 
regards to establishing community involvement.  As demonstrated by the Long Beach 
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example, communities have already been long involved in dealing with non-political 
forms of extremism.  The lessons learned from these communities and their respective 
programs could easily be adapted to address other forms of extremism. 
A key to the success of the Long Beach program was the need for cooperation and 
sharing of resources among multiple agencies and organizations (“interagency” 
cooperation at the local level) (Blancarte and Azeka, 1992).  Given the complexity of 
radicalization and the multitude of contributing factors, no single agency (at the federal, 
state, or local level) will be able to adequately address the problem, thus a multi-
discipline and multi-dimensional approach as prescribed in this chapter is required.  
Another contributing factor was adequate resourcing through a community development 
grant program. 
It should be noted, that a common theme in both the educational and community 
outreach programs was the focus on prevention, rather than rehabilitation.  It seems the 
consensus is that prevention is considered less expensive than rehabilitation.  Besides, as 
explained in Chapter VI, deradicalization has its challenges.  From a homeland security 
perspective, one could argue it is less expensive to fight a battle of ideas than a battle of 
arms.  “Arming” individuals so they are able to resist the attractiveness and popularity of 
militant ideologies is how the U.S. will win the battle of ideas. 
The Dutch Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism suggested the key 
to pulling radicalized individuals out of their radical isolation is to offer them other social 
prospects though the use of non-traditional means (e.g., social services, schools, and 
other institutions).  It was also recommended that municipal authorities need to take the 
lead in this process, with the national government providing support where necessary.  
Similarly, the CACP report stated such a prevention strategy requires a “whole-of-
government” approach that is centralized at the policy level (federal) and flexible at the 
implementation level (state and local).  The following chapter will recommend how to 
best incorporate these suggestions in implementing a U.S. counterradicalization strategy. 
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IX. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND THE WAY AHEAD  
Any power must be an enemy of mankind which enslaves the individual by 
terror or force, whether it arises under a fascist or communist flag.  All 
that is valuable in human society depends upon the opportunity for 
development accorded to the individual. 
-Albert Einstein27 
The research question posed at the start of this academic endeavor was, given the 
nature of the terrorist threat to homeland security, what strategy represents the most 
balanced approach to counter?  To answer this overarching question, three ancillary 
questions need to be addressed.  What is the nature of the threat facing the U.S.?  What 
are the ramifications of simply revising the current strategies related to homeland security 
and counterterrorism to incorporate an increased understanding of the enemy?  What 
alternative strategies are there to counter the threat? 
A. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE THREAT FACING THE U.S.? 
Chapter II and III detailed the diverse terrorist threat facing the U.S.  While the 
preponderance of the research focused on the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and other militant 
Islamist groups, even within this segment of literature, there was a range of thought 
concerning whether al-Qa’ida and its affiliates are the greatest threat, or an Islamist 
variation of a leaderless resistance.  The analysis found that both aspects of the threat are 
valid, and will likely continue to be for some time.  Furthermore, there were some 
disconcerting trends identified that add another dimension to the threat not addressed by 
the existing counterterrorism and homeland security strategies. 
Internal disagreements over indiscriminate mass casualty tactics, and a lack of 
violent activity, have led to fracturing within some regional militant Islamist groups (e.g., 
JI and AQIM) and intergroup fighting between others (HAMAS and Jund Ansar Allah, 
and the various Pakistani Taliban factions following Baitullah Mehsud’s death (Waraich, 
2009)).  However, this does not mean these splinter groups do not pose a threat.  Given 
                                                 
27 Retrieved September 16 from http://www.quoteworld.org/quotes/4105. 
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the tendency of these fringe elements to take an even more violent stance than the 
original organization, these smaller groups may actually represent a greater threat.  Then 
there is the possibility that members disenfranchised from the larger mainstream 
organizations may return home. 
At the same time, the U.S. has witnessed domestic radicalization influenced by 
militant Islamist and right-wing ideologies, and special-interest groups (e.g., 
environmentalists and pro-life).  Not only is domestic radicalization an internal problem, 
it has transnational implications.  In addition to Somali Americans who have departed to 
fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia, other U.S. citizens have been arrested for conspiring to 
commit terrorist acts abroad. 
This latter issue adds an interesting twist to radicalization and transnational 
terrorism.  As reflected in the national-level strategy documents, radicalization is closely 
linked with the transnational threat, most often in the context of groups like al-Qa’ida 
inspiring others to strike the U.S.  Now the U.S. is starting to witness cases of the 
exportation of domestic radicalization overseas.  What happens when combat hardened, 
radicalized individuals decide to come home?  Is the Nation’s counterterrorism strategy 
adaptable enough to address a change in threat that is fundamentally different than 
envisaged the last time the Nation’s counterterrorism was revised? 
Adding to this dilemma, the evidence shows terrorist networks, transnational and 
domestic, are changing.  They are becoming more dispersed and decentralized, and 
concepts, such as leaderless resistance or lone actors, are becoming more prevalent on the 
Web.  Lacking a centralized command structure, these networks are more reliant on a 
common ideology to serve as their inspiration.  In fact, the importance of formal 
organizations seems to be increasingly overshadowed by the ideology inspiring 
individuals to conduct terrorist acts.  Given the success of military operations abroad and 
law enforcement measures at home, as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri suggested, individual 
terrorism may be the only option for these movements to carry on.  A more diversified 
and individually-based threat requires a different strategy of prevention rather than just 
using security and law enforcement measures. 
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B. WHAT ARE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SIMPLY REVISING THE 
CURRENT STRATEGIES TO INCORPORATE AN INCREASED 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ENEMY? 
In order to defeat the terrorist threat the U.S. faces, the  9/11 Commission stated,  
“Our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and 
prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism” (9/11 
Commission, 2007, 363).  Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter V, the NSCT and NSHS 
do not provide a balanced approach to addressing the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendation.  Specifically, they fail to address how to counter the militant message 
fueling the radicalization process and persuading individuals to conduct terrorist acts. 
Disruption of the radicalization process becomes even more important when 
considering the nature of the terrorist threat facing the U.S.  No longer is the threat from 
abroad, the threat is now increasingly from within.  The disruption of multiple plots 
involving domestic extremists and polling data indicates the American population is not 
immune to radicalization.  Recent attacks by individuals supportive of right-wing and 
special-interest groups proves this phenomenon is not limited to any one ethic group, 
religion, or political orientation.  The current economic crisis and high employment rates 
are likely to acerbate social tensions in U.S. 
Countering domestic radicalization is a complex issue.  The research showed 
there is no single factor leading someone down the path of terrorism; as such, there are no 
simple means of identifying those vulnerable to radicalization.  Instead of focusing on 
why a person becomes a terrorist, a more practical option is to look at how a person 
becomes radicalized. 
Chapter IV described two models to help illustrate the radicalization process.  The 
early stages of these models offer the best opportunity to dissuade an individual from 
becoming a terrorist.  Thus, the logical conclusion is that preventing an individual from 
becoming a terrorist requires a strategy focused on disrupting the pre-radicalization and 
the conversion/identification phases.  The radicalizing influences in the U.S. are focused 
on these same phases.  To win the battle of ideas, U.S. strategy must focus on the same 
“battlefield” as the adversary. 
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Whether one believes traditional transnational groups or decentralized 
organizations pose the greater threat, the simple fact is current U.S. strategy does not 
adequately address the domestic threat or the radicalization process.  Based on these two 
issues alone, one could argue the national strategies, at a minimum, need updating to 
address the homegrown self-radicalization phenomenon.  However, revising the current 
strategies may not be enough.  As Figure 4 illustrates, the focus of a counterterrorism 
strategy is typically different from one for countering radicalization. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Focus Areas of Counterradicalization and Counterterrorism Strategies (After 
Precht, 2007, 71). 
Despite the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation, the current U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy does not provide a balanced approach to addressing the 
problem.  Specifically, it fails to address how to counter the militant message fueling the 
radicalization process persuading people to conduct terrorist acts.  It also does not address 
how to engage those communities most at risk. 
Furthermore, counterterrorism strategies typically focus on security and law 
enforcement measures.  While such a strategy can contain a threat, a heavy-handed 
response (perceived or actual) may incite others to take action, as with the case of U.S. 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Based on this unintended consequence, at times a 
non-security based, non-coercive approach is the best option, particularly if the goal is to 
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prevent domestic radicalization.  Instead of just revising the current NSCT and NSHS, a 
more practical solution is to create a standalone national strategy for countering 
radicalization. 
C. WHAT ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES ARE THERE TO COUNTER THE 
THREAT? 
The UN CTITF’s inventory of counterradicalization and deradicalization 
programs reflected a wide variety of counterradicalization measures, both preventive and 
reactive.  However, there are few countries with an all-encompassing 
counterradicalization strategy addressing all aspects of radicalization, the exception being 
the UK.  In addition to the Prevent section of CONTEST, there are supporting documents 
further explaining the strategy and defining the roles of government and non-government 
players.  Collectively these documents offer one of the most in depth and detailed 
strategies to counter radicalization.  However, there are some aspects of Prevent that are 
not applicable or exportable to the U.S., as they could potentially impact the 
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens, particularly those provided by the First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
Chapters VII and VIII offered two solutions for countering radicalization; one a 
purely technical approach focusing on countering extremist use of the Internet 
(countering the messenger), the other a far more encompassing multi-dimensional 
approach focusing on individuals at risk (protecting the target). 
The technical solution identified was found to be inadequate.  The ability of the 
U.S. Government to disrupt use of the Internet as a tool for radicalization, or day-to-day 
operations for that matter, appears to be minimal.  Countering radicalization over the 
Internet is not easy.  Extremist use of the Internet is constantly in flux, with Web sites 
appearing and disappearing regularly.  While there are several technical tools to help 
counter extremist use of the Internet, there are also policy, civil liberty and legal issues 
that influence their usage, particularly in regards to computer or network attack.  While 
there are scenarios where denial-of-service attacks could disrupt the planning 
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andexecution of terrorist operations; in the end, technical solutions offer minimal utility 
in countering radicalization.  While the Internet can facilitate the radicalization of an 
individual, it is not the source of the problem. 
Rather, a more effective means of dealing with radicalization in the homeland 
requires a partnership of government (local, State, and Federal), faith-based and 
community organizations, and the private sector.  These institutions must work together 
in order to produce resilient individuals.  The multi-dimensional solution proposed in 
Chapter VIII offers a variety of options to countering the militant narrative, including 
educational programs (traditional and non-traditional), outreach programs, and 
community involvement.  Through these means, individuals can be provided the tools to 
make them more resistant to the attractiveness and popularity of militant ideologies.  By 
strengthening individual resiliency is how the U.S. will win the battle of ideas. 
D. TERRORISM WILL NOT GO AWAY 
Despite evidence provided in the previous chapters, there are still some who 
might argue the that U.S. does not need a counterradicalization strategy, as the current 
terrorist threat will not last indefinitely.  From an historical perspective, this is technically 
correct.  However, using history as an indicator, the current threat will be followed by 
another extremist movement; one that has learned from the accomplishments and 
mistakes of its predecessors. 
According to terrorism expert David Rapoport (2001), modern terrorism can be 
seen as coming in waves.  The first wave began with the Russian Anarchist movement.28  
This wave died out with the onset of World War I, to be followed by an anti-colonial 
movement focused on national self-determination (the beginning of the freedom fighter 
analogy).  This movement was supplanted by the dynamics of the Cold War and the 
emergence of leftist movements who saw themselves as the vanguard of the third world.  
The current wave built on the success of the Iranian revolution (1979) and the defeat of 
                                                 
28 The Russian anarchist movement is noted for introducing the concepts of bombing and martyrdom 
operations, as well, as the contemporary usage of the term terrorist.  Anarchists called themselves terrorists 
to distinguish themselves from guerillas (Rapoport, 2001). 
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the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (1989), and the end of the Cold War.  Interestingly, 
through looking at the history of modern terrorism, one can conclude these movements 
typically last about a generation, at which point the younger generation tends to follow a 
different calling (Rapoport, 2001). 
What does this mean?  Even if the U.S. is successful in defeating al-Qa’ida, the 
use of terrorism as a tactic will transition to the next extremist movement.  Given the 
trend of increasing violence, from anarchist use of dynamite to al-Qa’ida’s weaponization 
of airliners, the next movement is likely to be even more lethal. 
Regardless of the orientation of the next movement, there are two things certain.  
Those individuals radicalized by the next movement’s ideology will follow the same 
pathway as described in Chapter IV.  The process will continue to accelerate due to 
advancements in information technology.  Therefore, there will be a continuing need to 
counter this process. 
E. IS THERE A NEED FOR ANOTHER STRATEGY? 
With ten national strategies related to countering terrorism, this is a valid 
question.  What will the proposed strategy add to the Nation’s collective effort? 
As discussed in Chapters II and IV, there is a significant gap in the nation’s 
collective counterterrorism strategy.  Current strategy places a significant emphasis on 
coercive measures to counter the threat.  However, as claimed by individuals recently 
detained, these measures can factor into the radicalization process.  Yet, there is minimal 
emphasis on radicalization, and what little there is, is focused on issues overseas.  The 
current strategy treats radicalization as an afterthought and as a result, there are few 
resources dedicated to addressing this problem, especially when compared to the 
resources dedicated to combating those already radicalized. 
As depicted in Figure 5, a separate counterradicalization strategy would help fill 
in the gaps in the current U.S. strategy.  Such a strategy would also help increase 




strategy would reduce the reliance on coercive (security and law enforcement) measures, 
helping to eliminate some of the policy issues fueling the radicalization process.  Table 2 
summarizes the benefits of a domestic counterradicalization strategy. 
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• A balanced counterterrorism approach 
• A separate counterradicalization 
strategy 
• A counterradicalization grant program  
Raise 
• Awareness of sources of radicalization 
• Reliance on non-coercive measures 
• Dedicated resources for countering 
radicalization at the Federal, State, and 
local levels 
Reduce 
• Reliance on coercive (security force & 
law enforcement) measures to counter 
the threat 
Eliminate 
• Policy issues that may fuel domestic 
radicalization 
Table 2.   Benefits of a Domestic Counterradicalization Strategy. 
F. RECOMMEND STRATEGY FRAMEWORK 
In developing a counterradicalization strategy, the first question that comes to 
mind is, what should it look like?  As a starting point, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation 
of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO, 2004) 
identifies six desirable characteristics of an ideal strategy:  purpose, scope, methodology; 
problem definition and risk assessment; goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and 
performance measures; resources, investments, and risk management; organizational 
roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and integration and implementation (GAO, 
2004, 3).  If the decision is to go forward with the creation of a domestic 
counterradicalization strategy, it is highly recommended the GAO’s guidance serve as the 
framework for the document. 
G. WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE? 
The challenge in constructing a counterradicalization strategy is that no single 
public or private organization can adequately support all the proposed objectives.  The 
means to deliver this program go beyond the capability of government (federal, state, and 
local).  To effectively counter radicalization requires the collective efforts of a variety of 
government, private, and civil society (e.g., nongovernmental organizations, professional 
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associations, religious and advocacy groups) sources.  Such a strategy requires a 
collaborative approach as described in Megacommunities:  How Leaders of Government, 
Business, and Non-profits can tackle Today’s Global Challenges Together (Gerencser, 
Vann, Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly, 2008).  In some situations, government involvement is 
problematic, as its policies can be perceived as an underlying factor in the radicalization 
process.  In some cases, local communities are best positioned to offer services; however, 
they are unlikely to be resourced to address all issues.  In others, private businesses are 
the best positioned and resourced, but have no authority to act.  Given these shortfalls, all 
sectors are necessary to maintain a sustainable counterradicalization strategy. 
To ensure synchronization of the efforts involved, it is recommended DHS be 
designated as the lead agency for developing the counterradicalization strategy document.  
This should be a joint effort between the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and 
the Radicalization and Engagement Working Group. 
It is also recommended that DHS establish a national-level working group to help 
synchronize efforts nationwide.  This counterradicalization working group would consist 
of members throughout the proposed megacommunity.  While not all inclusive, some of 
the organizations to be invited to participate include: DOS, the Department of Education, 
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Rights Working Group, the American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, Arab American Institute, Arab Community Center for 
Economic and Social Services, Asian American Justice Center, Center for National 
Security Studies, Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights & Education Fund, and South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow.  In 
addition, there should be representatives from the media and faith-based organizations 
(e.g., Interfaith Youth Corp).  These are just a few of the organizations required to be 
involved in the process. 
Similarly, working groups should be established at the state level to synchronize 
planning efforts across the various localities.  At this level, the emphasis is on engaging 
with civic leaders, businesspersons, and educational institutions to develop a multi-
discipline engagement and outreach program. 
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Additionally, it is recommend that DHS temporarily field liaisons to each of the 
states to ensure efforts at the federal and state levels are synchronized.  In states having 
an existing relationship with DHS, these positions could be leveraged in order to reduce 
operating costs.  Once the state programs are established, the national-level working 
group will assume the coordination function of these liaisons. 
Given the importance of education in the proposed approach, a University and 
Agency Partnership Initiative, modeled after the program sponsored by the Naval 
Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, should be established to 
bring together institutions to further study on radicalization.  This academic partnership 
could also develop counterradicalization and violence prevention curriculum for use at 
the state and local levels. 
H. WHO WILL FUND? 
As illustrated by the Long Beach community outreach program (Chapter VII), one 
of the keys to success was ensuring that the program was adequately resourced.  It is 
recommended that a grant type program be established to assist state and local 
governments, and their non-government partners, in creating programs in support of this 
strategy.  This program would be similar to the UK’s Pathfinder Fund, established to help 
authorities and groups develop programs to tackle violent extremism at the local level. 
Initially, two existing funding mechanisms could be used to assist in starting such 
a grant program.  DHS manages the Homeland Security Grant Program and a counter 
radicalization element could be added.  An alternative funding mechanism is DOJ’s 
Weed and Seed Communities Competitive Grant program managed by the Community 
Capacity Development Office (CCDO).  CCDO already has experience working at the 
local community level in regards to violent and drug crimes.  Such a program could be 
expanded to help strengthen community capacity to address radicalization and build long-
term resilience. 
However, this is not only about government funding.  Through actively engaging 
the private sector, other funding sources can be developed (e.g., scholarship funds and 
internships). 
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I. PHASING OF THE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Key policy makers must be engaged prior to the start of the process as the 
proposal calls for these agencies to accept ownership of key strategy components (e.g., 
White House (approving authority), DHS (strategy author, grant program manager), and 
DOJ (alternative grant program manager)).  Without their acceptance, this initiative is 
unlikely to move forward beyond the infancy stage.  Engagement efforts will focus on 
securing their support and strengthening interest for such a strategy. 
The next phase of engagement will focus on those not directly responsible for 
constructing policy, but without their support, it is unlikely the strategy could be 
successfully implemented.  Several in this sector have key implementation roles (e.g., the 
media, DOE, state and local authorities, etc.).  Others can influence policy by their ability 
to mobilize public opinion (ACLU and other advocate groups).  Their involvement will 
ultimately help frame the final product.  As with policy makers, engagement will focus 
on acquiring their support, while at the same time building interest. 
Next are those serving as the primary means of delivering the message to the 
intended audience (e.g., credible voices, civic leaders, businesspersons, community 
outreach programs, faith-based organizations, educational institutions, etc.).  While they 
may have less power to directly influence the policy, they will be very interested in the 
product, due to their association.  As the primary means of delivery, they will also a role 
in shaping the strategy.  Initial engagement will focus on securing sector support, but as 
the development of the strategy unfolds, shift toward maintaining a high-level of interest. 
Throughout this entire process, the American public will need to be kept 
informed.  Some societal elements will be suspicious of such a strategy, and an effort will 
have to be made to build trust prior to and during implementation.  Failure to effectively 
communicate the purpose and benefits of this strategy, could lead to public mistrust, 
which could actually lead to further radicalization in some segments of the American 
population. 
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J. GLOBAL SYNCHRONIZATION 
The objectives discussed so far are primarily domestically oriented; however, 
radicalization is a global challenge.  In an age of globalization, where individuals, money 
and ideas move internationally with ease, the environment is equally conducive to the 
spread of violent ideologies.  To be effective, U.S. counterradicalization efforts must 
have a global perspective. 
Just as the U.S. counterterrorism strategy must be synchronized with those of 
other countries, this strategy must be coordinated with other counterradicalization and 
deradicalization efforts.  As the UN CTITF inventory of state programs shows, other 
countries are working to address internal radicalization problems.  Incorporating lessons 
learned “over there” will prevent making past mistakes “over here.”  Additionally, some 
countries may require assistance (monetary and non-monetary) in developing or 
enhancing their programs.  As the 9/11 attacks clearly demonstrate, failure to address 
problems overseas poses dangerous consequences for the homeland.  The U.S. 
Government should reapportion some of its counterterrorism funding to assist in 
reinforcing counterradicalization and deradicalization measures abroad. 
K. ADDITIONAL AREAS OF RESEARCH 
Despite the significant amount of the research conducted to date, the continuing 
evolution of the threat and the radicalization process ensures there are still areas needing 
to be addressed. 
Based on Rapoport's wave theory, consideration needs to be given to what might 
be the next wave or “ism.”  Modern history has already provided a host of radical 
movements and groups (anarchists, communists, fascists, Islamists, etc.); could special-
interest groups represent the next threat?  Given the impact of online social applications, 
like Twitter and Facebook, in the recent election related unrest in Iran, could these tools 
allow smaller, dispersed networks to rapidly mobilize forces to take action? 
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Along this line of thought, given the likelihood leaderless resistance will become 
more prevalent, there is also a need for a more in-depth understanding of the dynamics of 
self-radicalization, and how this contributes to the lone actor threat.  In the past, these 
individuals would have been considered anti-social.  However, the Internet allows 
individual extremists to interact with groups in ways that would be inconceivable face-to-
face (such as a Native American interacting with neo-Nazis).  Can this source of virtual 
inspiration and encouragement completely take the place of face-to-face interaction?  If 
so, what is the best means of delivering a counter narrative to lone actors? 
Based on the increasing importance of the Internet in the radicalization process, 
more thought also needs to be given to how virtual communities could play into terrorist 
training.  Massive Multi-Player Online Role-Playing Games, such as the “World of 
Warcraft” and “Second Life,” have become increasingly popular.  Could extremist 
groups use these virtual worlds to radicalize and train members?  The study of these 
virtual worlds could offer an insight into online interaction and virtual sociability. 
L. FINAL THOUGHTS 
As the threat to homeland security evolves, so must the strategy to counter.  
However, this is not just a matter of adding a new chapter to existing strategies.  
“Countering such efforts demands that we treat immigrant and youth populations not as a 
source of threat to be defended against, but as a target of enemy subversion to be 
protected and supported” (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009a, 12). 
To provide this level of protection and support, the Nation’s counterterrorism strategy 
needs to be supplemented by a separate strategy focusing on counterradicalization, much 
like the Prevent component of the UK’s CONTEST strategy. 
Why a separate strategy?  Simply because the tools used to win the “war on 




Until the U.S. can effectively counter the attractiveness of militant ideologies and 
rhetoric, the possibility remains that someone in the homeland will be receptive to the 
message.  It does not take an entire terrorist network to pose a threat to homeland 
security.  As Timothy McVeigh proved, it only takes one to kill hundreds.  John Allen 
Muhammad and John Lee Malvo proved it only takes two to terrorize a large urban area.  
Shirwa Ahmed proved there are those in the U.S. willing to sacrifice their lives to defend 
their radical beliefs.  Developing a strategy to counter radicalization in the homeland is 




APPENDIX  FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (FTOS) 
This following list comprises the DOS designated FTOs as of July 2009 (Office 
of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009b).  Italicized group names are additions 
since October 2001 (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2001). 
 Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 
 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
 Ansar al-Islam (AI) 
 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 
 Asbat al-Ansar 
 Aum Shinrikyo 
 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 
 Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) 
 Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
 Gama'a al-Islamiyya  (Islamic Group) (IG) 
 Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyya (HAMAS) (Islamic Resistance 
Movement) 
 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) 
 Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) 
 Hizballah (Party of God) 
 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) 
 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
 Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed) (JEM) 
 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 
  Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) 
 Kahane Chai (Kach) 
 Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) 
 Kongra-Gel (KGK) (formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 
 Lashkar e-Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous) (LT) 
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 Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) 
 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
 Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) 
 Mujahadin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) 
 National Liberation Army (ELN) 
 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 
 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-
GC) 
 Al-Qa’ida 
 Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (formerly Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat, and  (GSPC)) 
 Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) 
 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
 Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) (formerly Revolutionary People’s Struggle 
ELA)) 
 Revolutionary Organization 17 November 
 Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 
 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) (SL) 
 Al-Shabaab 
 Tanzim Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (formerly al-Qaida 
in Iraq,  Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad (JTJ), and al-Zarqawi Network) 
 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
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